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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 AIMS: This thesi s ex amine s the meaning of var i ous 
English terms of emot i on , and attempt s to s h ow that a spe cts 
of their meaning can be related to t heir syn ta c ti c 
behav i o ur . 
Although people have been writing about em o tion s fr om 
at least the time of Aristotle (384 BC 3 2 2 BC) , the 
s ubje c t has attracted particular attention over the last 
twenty five years from philosophers, psychologists , 
ethnographers and linguists . However, in a review of the 
previous decade of anthropological research on emotions, 
Lutz and White have written: 
Given the extent to which English emotion words ha ~·e 
been used for research. it is somewhat su r pr-ising that 
the,Y have not come in f'or more attent i on as objects of 
research. (1986:423) 
This is an attempt to help redre s~ Lhe balance. 
1.2 THE RELATION BETWEEN SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 
The idea that s yntactic behaviour can tell us something 
about meaning is n ot new. Linguists like Bolinger (1977 ), 
Dixon (1982), Haiman (1985) and Wierzbicka (1988) all wo rk 
from the premise that syntactic properties have a semantic 
base . They hold that language is primarily for the 
expression of meaning, and that syntax functions as one 
aspect of semantics. 
Language is an 
"conspires" to 
constructions, 
intonation). 
As Wierzbicka puts it: 
integrated system, where everything 
convey meaning - words, grammatical 
and illocutionary devices (including 
(1988:1) 
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Both the nature of the lexical item, and its behaviour in an 
utterance are relevant to semantics, and it is often 
difficult to draw a line between grammatical and lexical 
meaning. Emotion terms, for instance, do not belong to any 
o ne grammatical class; they can be transitive verbs (love, 
hate) , past part i c i p 1 es (annoyed, frightened), adjectives 
(anxious, guilty), nouns (pride, joy). Such properties, 
regardless of whether they are labelled lexical or 
grammatical, are part of the word's meaning. 
Although emotion terms do not form a single grammatical 
class in English, they tend to be expressed in a relatively 
small number of syntactic constructions. These include: 
where 
a) Xis adj./past participle (+ prep.phrase) 
(Mary is angry (with George)). 
the experiencer is described adjectivally or as 
"passive" There are variations on this pattern - e.g. Mary 
felt angry, Mary got angry, Mary became angry. The 
prepositional phrase is optional. 
b) X TAKES NP+ prep.phrase 
(George takes pride in his garden.) 
Here the experiencer's volition is involved. 
c) X verbs Y 
(George hates you) 
The emotion is expressed as a transitive verb, 
object directly affected or focussed upon. 
2 
with an 
d) X verbs (+ prep.phrase) 
(George worries (about her)) 
The emotion is expressed as an intransitive verb. There 
will be no object directly affected or focussed upon, but 
there may be an oblique object in the prepositional phrase. 
If shared syntactic patterns reflect shared semantic 
components, then it should be possible to isolate the 
meaning of a given construction by examining it with the 
full range of words that can occur within this frame. In 
order to be able to link syntactic behaviour with aspects of 
meaning, I need definitions of emotion terms. The process 
then becomes a two-way one. By taking a particular 
syntactic construction - say, X 1s FOR Y, and examining 
the definitions of all emotion terms that can be used in 
this construction (sorry, grateful, happy etc.), I should be 
able to isolate what aspect of meaning they share, and thus 
identify the meaning of the construction. This can also 
work 1.n reverse. The fact that a particular emotion word 
can behave 1.n a particular way can be used as supporting 
evidence for some aspect of the meaning of that word. 
Isolating the meaning of a syntactic construction should 
also tell us something about the way 1. n which we 
conceptualize the particular emotions thus expressed. 
Examining all these constructions 1.n depth 1s a bigger 
task than 1.s possible here. Accordingly I have limited this 
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thesis to a detailed analysis of the first construction 
mentioned: 
Xis {adj./past part.emotion term}+ prep.phrase 
(X is angry with Y, X is frightened of Y) 
as it varies for different prepositions, and my case studies 
to emotion terms which fit this frame, i.e. those with the 
form of adjectives or past participles. I have discussed 
some aspects of the other constructions when they have been 
relevant to particular case studies (e.g. proud, which may 
be used in three of the four constructions listed: viz. I am 
proud of my garden, I take pride 1.n my garden, 
myself on my garden) . 
I pride 
Because I am concerned with the process of identifying 
meaning in syntax, I could just as easily have taken the 
other constructions as my starting point. However, the 
adjective/past participle form is arguably the form used 
most frequently when people talk about emotion. And as 
Sarbin has pointed out (1986:85), the concept of emotion 1s 
a relatively modern one, largely replacing what used to be 
referred to as passions. (See also Solomon) Passions were 
a class of occurrences that "happened" to people. The 
person who suffers the passion is a passive victim. So from 
the historical point of view as well as that of frequency, 
there may be merit 1 n starting with the "passive" 
construction. 
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• 
1.3 THE SEMANTIC METALANGUAGE 
To describe meaning requires a formalized metalanguage . 
if we are not to define complex terms via other complex 
terms. We need a set of semantic primitives, as proposed by 
Boguslawski (1966 and 1970). Wierzbicka and her colleagues , 
particularly Goddard ( in press), have been working on the 
development of such a metalanguage for some years. Ideally , 
the metalexicon should consist only of words which are both 
semanti c primitives (words which cannot be broken down into 
s i_ mp 1 e I' concepts) and lexical universals, referring to 
universal human concepts, represented as lexical items in 
all languages. The present list has about thirty candidates 
words like I. you, time. place, want. say, think and so 
on. It should be pointed out that work on this list 1s far 
from c omplete . (See Wierzbicka 1972, 1987, 1988) . F o r 
purposes of lexicography and descriptive grammar , to avoid 
long and unwieldy definitions, I have used an expanded list, 
including words which, although not universals, recur widely 
in the languages of the world as separate lexical items. 
(See Appendix 1). Because grammatical constructions as well 
as lexical items carry cultural baggage, the syntax of the 
metalanguage should ideally be based on a very limited 
number of patterns I want this, I think of this, and so 
on. In my definitions, I have stretched this restriction 
somewhat, believing that, for my purposes, the benefits of 
readability and intelligibility outweigh the disadvantages 
of using concepts which may not be entirely culture-free. 
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In response to linguists such as Pulman ( 1983) who 
question the legitimacy of semantic primitives that are 
expressed in words that look like English, perhaps I should 
clai m only that I have tried to express my definitions in 
wo rds and structures that are relatively "simple". I know 
of no other way of describing cultural concepts and defining 
meaning that comes anywhere near this o ne in terms o f 
precision and flexibility. It may not be a perfect meth od, 
but it JS the best we have , and it is, I believe , sufficient 
fo r my purposes here. 
1.4 WHAT DOES AN EMOTION TERM REPRESENT? 
Various people (Davitz 1969: Wierzbicka 1972: 
Iordanskaja 1974: Solomon 1977: and Johnson-Laird and Oatley 
1989) have either compiled definitions of emotion terms, or 
have produced 
isolating the 
analysis I use 
Iordanskaja who 
a theory of classification based upon 
main dimensions of emotion terms. The 
is based on the work of Wierzbicka and 
look for a common conceptual structure 
rather than for common dimensions or a hierarchy based on a 
limited number of basic emotions. 
Though a considerable amount has been written about 
emotions 1n recent years, there 1s still uncertainty about 
the concept. Competing theories sometimes turn out to be 
about different things. This 1s largely because emotion 
terms do not refer to observable objects 1n the physical 
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world, but to vague internal happenings. We do not have a 
common definition. In Sarbin's words: 
Some writers talk of "having" an emotion , others of the 
"experience" of emotion; some equate emotion with 
visceral activity (tears, sweat, blood), some with the 
perception of visceral activity; some use emotion and 
feelings as equivalents, others argue that feelings are 
constitutive of emotion; others treat emotions as 
patterned organismic responses; some cite reflex.es as 
pro to t_ypi c of emotion . .. 
(1986:85) 
A complicating factor is that the study of emotions 
does not fit neatly into our classification of knowledge. 
It is an area of interest to philosophers, psychologists, 
ethnographers and linguists; and researchers have not only 
to try to make sense of aspects of emotion in ways that are 
appropriate to their own discipline, but ideally to 
contribute to a grand theory of emotion that holds good for 
all disciplines. 
So what is an emotion as conceptualized by an English 
speaker? What are the essential elements, that should be 
specified in any definition of a particular emotion term and 
wi 11 be sufficient to distinguish between, for example, 
angry and annoyed, or furious and outraged? 
One class of behavioural elements expressive 
reactions such as weeping, laughing, frowning, blushing and 
so on has played a central role in theories of emotion. 
Psychologists have often been concerned with physiological 
states, facial expressions, and the identification of 
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subjective feeling states that typically accompany emotional 
experiences. In their discussion, they refer to these 
feeling states or these facial expressions by the emotion 
term which represents the concept of which they are a 
typical part e. g· . as angry or happy or frightened. 
However. to quote Lutz and White: 
Both linguistic theory and ethnographic studies 
indicate that emotion words do not function solely, or 
e -..,,.·en pr i mar i 1 y . as 1 ab e 1 s for fee 1 i ng s ta t es or fa c i a 1 
es:press1ons. 
(1986:417) 
We are concerned here not with the phenomenon of anger or 
fear, but with what the linguistic term represents. As 
researchers have discovered, it 1.s virtually impossible to 
djsti.nguish between, say, horrified and terrified, relying 
only on facial expression or differentiated feeling states. 
(See Russell:24-28) But it 1. s poss i b 1 e to do so by 
c o n s i d e r· i. n g t h e n a t u r e o f t h e i r a ppr a i s a 1 s . Ortony and 
C]ore write: 
Emotions cannot be characterized adequately solely 1.n 
terms of feelings; to be an emotion, the feelings must 
signify the results of an appraisal of some kind. 
Thus, sadness is not simply a particular kind of 
feeling, but a particular kind of feeling for a 
particular kind of reason. 
(1989:129) 
Emotions have their origins reflex actions 
instinctive, genetically-wired responses that can be seen 1n 
very young babies, such as starting at a sudden noise or 
crying out in pain. Within a given species, such responses 
are universal. One of the primary characteristics of humans 
1s consciousness of one's actions, an ability to monitor 
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one's responses, store them in memory and utilize this 
knowledge in one's subsequ-ent behaviour. As Averill puts 
it: 
the experience of emotion is a product not of first 
order monitoring [experiencing the raw sensations} but 
of second-order moni taring, [when] awareness is 
ref'lected ba c k upon itself, interpreting the original 
experience. But behavior cannot simply be 
interpreted: It must be interpreted as some thing -
e.g. as anger or fear. That some thing 1 s the meaning 
of the emotion. 
(1982:21-23). 
Our society has developed concepts and labelled them, and 
this permits us to use these labels in our speech and 
thoughts, to interpret our own behaviour and the behaviour 
o f others. Not only do we interpret our own experience in 
the light of past experience, but we do so accordirig to the 
behavioural norms of the society in which we live. 
Solomon, a philosopher, describes an emotion as 
a basic judgment about our Selves and our place in the 
world, the projection of the values and ideals, 
structures and mythologies, according to which we live 
and through which we experience our lives. 
(1977:185) 
Averill, a psychologist, refers to emotions as 
socially constituted syndromes (transitory social 
roles) which include a person's appraisal of the 
situation, and which are interpreted as passions 
(things that happen to us) rather than as actions 
(things we do). (1982:4) 
Underpinning any emotion term is a complex scene that 
includes an appraisal of some situation, taking particular 
things into account. Specific emotions arise out of 
s pecific circumstances. Some ( indignant, jealous) involve 
perceived violation of our rights. Some (relieved, 
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disappoin.f:ed) require prior expectations. Some (cross) 
require us to consider the object of our emotion as child-
like. Such properties are a part of the word's meaning. In 
order to identify where meanings differ we need to ask 
ourselves, "What sort of appraisals do we make when we are 
angry or jealous? How do these appraisals differ for 
semantically similar words like indignant, offended, 
outraged, annoyed, cross, furious, irl'itated?" and so on. 
There is theoretically no limit to the number of 
s pecific properties that an emotion term can possess. 
Solomon has written 
The number of emotions is all but indeterminate, 
depending upon how finely one is willing to carve up 
and individuate the small differences between similar 
emotions. How many emotions are there? As many as 
we care to distinguish. 
(1977:281-2) 
This cognitive theory of emotion represents an emotion 
as consisting of three essentials: 
1. the stimulus (awareness of a particular situation) 
2. the cognitive process (judging a situation 
according to our own needs, in the light of past 
experience and often with reference to societal 
values) ; 
3. the resulting feeling. 
(Sensations like hungry or cold differ from emotions in 
lacking the second stage.) 
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I see the crucial factors in a definition of any 
emotion term as co ming from stages 1 and 2 above i.e. 
isolating whatever part of the situation is relevant, and 
explaining how it relates to us. I see no need to elaborate 
on the resulting feeling (and doubt whether I could. such 
feelings being known only to the experiencer), beyond 
judging it either good or bad. Although emotions frequently 
produce 1n us expressive reactors, such as smiling, weeping, 
blushing, frowning and so on, these are not essential 
features of any emotion. People react in different ways . 
Some people raise their voices and behave aggressively when 
ang r·y. Others maintain an icy and aloof silence. It 1 s 
sufficient to 
feeling. 
the definition that there 1s a resulting 
1.5 THE ETHNOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE 
The question of just what an emotion term encompasses 
is of both anthropological and linguistic importance. For a 
growing number of anthropologists, including Lutz in her 
study of the Ifaluk of Micronesia ( 1985a and b), Rosal do 
with the Ilongots of the Philippines (1980), Briggs with the 
Utku Eskimos (1970) and Levy with the Tahitians (1973), the 
emotional domain has served as a window into the beliefs, 
values, and behavioural norms of its culture. 
People from other cultures may conceptualize and label 
experiences that are accompanied by affective states such as 
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weeping, laughing , b l ushing and s o on , i n a v arie ty o f wa y s 
that are not dir ec tly comparable to our own . Not al 1 
cultures recognize what we call emotions as a distinc t 
do ma i n . (See Russell (1989) for a review of the 
e thnographic re c ord on emotion lexicons) . For instance , the 
S amoans have a word, lagona, that groups together wha t we 
would refer to as feelings and sensations (Gerber : 1 985) . 
T h e Chewong, a small aboriginal group in central Malaysia , 
g r o up together what we would identify as feelings and 
th o ughts by locating them both in the liver (Howell:1981). 
The ext e nt to which different cultures lexicalize words that 
c orre s pond more or less to our emotions varies enormously . 
He e l as, in a survey of "exotic" ways in which societies talk 
about " e motions", quotes Hallpike 1.n describing the Ommura 
p e ople of Papua as having "a general absence of terms to 
d e scribe inner states." (Heelas 1986:238) Howell was able 
to identify fewer than ten such terms for the Chewong . 
English has arguably several hundred. (Johnson-Laird and 
Oatley work from a list of 590 words.)# But even if a 
culture recognizes a semantic field similar to our own, with 
concepts that signify affective states based on particular 
# The task of trying to count the number of emotion 
words 1n English 1s fraught with difficulties. For 
in s tan c e , do we "feel" something when we are puzzled , 
c urious, suspicious? Do we count words like cranky or shy 
that refer to a tendency to certain emotions rather than the 
experience itself? Even where there is no disagreement over 
a word's admissability there are problems. Because emotion 
term s do not belong to a single grammatical category, should 
we count disappoint/ disappointed/ disappointment as one 
word or three? If three, then upset is arguably worth 
three, having the same form for noun, verb and adjective. 
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appraisals of the si tuation , the part i cular apprai s als wh ic h 
are singled out for labelling will be spec i fic to t hat 
culture, dependent on the value s y stems of that culture . 
The problem has been highlighted by a group of 
researchers examining depression from historical and 
anthropological perspectives (Kleinman and Good : 1985). The 
authors argue 
that collection and analysis of cultural data IS 
inherently problematic . There is no value-free 
language for recording cultural meaning. Cross-
cultural work necessarily. involves translation between 
distinctive systems of meaning . . . These authors express 
discomfort with the vast co1•pus of clinical and 
epidemiological studies that regard translation as a 
minor and largely unproblematic task. Fo1· them, 
translation is the central concern if culture IS taken 
seriously . (1985:38). 
How then can anthropologists (or anyone else) write about 
emotions in a scientific way if they cannot apply their own 
emotion terms to describe the emotional world of other 
cultures? Anthropologists from Malinowski in the 30's to 
Geertz in the ?O's and Lutz in the 80's, have drawn 
attention to the dangers of interpreting another's culture 
through the norms of one's own. Lutz addresses the problem 
specifically in her article Ethnopsychology Compared to 
What? (19856:35-79) For a substantial amount of research , 
the norm is American ethnotheory, 
terminology. 
described via English 
The problem has been indirectly highlighted by 
psychologists like Ekman ( 1989), Izard and others who are 
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searching for what is universal in emotion and finding it in 
English emotion concepts like anger and disgust. 
The problems faced by ethnographers wanting to discuss 
in their own language concepts from another, and to compare 
co n ce pts from a variety of cultures further underlines the 
need for a semantic metalanguage that avoids cultural 
co ncepts . 
1.6 ORGANIZATION 
and 
This thesis consists of two distinct sections: 
A. a number of case studies of English emotion 
adjectives and past participles in context; 
B . a detailed examination of the syntactic frames 
within which adjective and past participle emotion 
terms typically appear, and their possible 
semantic contribution. 
A. The Case Studies: 
These contain i ) examples in context 
ii) the definition and justification 
i i i ) discussion of aspects of syntactic 
behaviour. 
I have defined sixteen words, either adjectives or past 
participles. 
their selection. 
Not too much importance should be accorded 
I wanted to include the more frequently 
used words. I wanted to include groups of semantically 
si milar words, because I was concerned to be able to 
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identify .the subtle differences of meaning between, for 
instance, frightened and afraid, angr,v and annoyed. And I 
have included pairs of words like fed up and sick and tired 
where the difference in meaning seems minimal, but which 
nonetheless use different syntactic frames. Obviously this 
is not a broadly representative group. There are no 
positive emotions, for instance, nor any belonging to the 
s ad- type. This is simply due to the constraints of time. I 
believe my overall purpose in describing an exploratory 
pr·oce s s is not weakened by their . . omission . 
DATA: Because I am concerned with the contexts of 
emotion terms, I required a considerable amount of data. I 
have collected examples from a variety of sources mainly 
the local newspaper The Canberra Times, but also from 
books, magazines and television. I also obtained data from 
the Survey of English Usage carried out by University 
Co 11 ege London. This gave me access to a much larger 
collection of emotion terms in context than would have been 
possible from my efforts alone. 
Unreferenced examples are my own. 
The examples I have listed at the head of each 
definition have been selected as most illustrative of the 
particular situation in as few words as possible. 
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I have used a standardized framework for my definitions 
which corresponds to the three stages of an emotion outlined 
earlier, namely -
1. the stimulus 
2. the cognitive process 
3. the resulting feeling. 
The ce ntral c omponents correspond to stages 1 and 2 in 
containing everything that is necessary for distinguishing a 
particular emotion term. Although many of my definitions 
have more than two central components, their total effect 
will be, I hope, to give a complete picture of the situation 
and the judgments made about it. Stage 3 is the same for 
every definition, apart from the assigning of good or bad to 
the emotion. 
Verification of definitions: 
I have relied on three methods to verify my definitions. 
First, I have endeavoured always to check my definitions 
against a wide range of examples in context. Second, I have 
used "negative" examples to prove or disprove the existence 
of particular components. A good negative example provides 
probably the clearest proof of a component of meaning, but 
its use as a tool requires skill 1n knowing what contrasts 
to make, and in finding examples that highlight this 
contrast and no other. 
by syntax. 
Third, I have used the clues offered 
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It may be worth saying that writ i ng definition s i s a 
task for which there i s no standard of s uccess . There is no 
such thing as a perfect definit i on. (In whose judgment? 
For what purpo s es?) There will always be room for revision 
and improvement. We may believe we have "proved" that 
particular components are a part of a word's meaning, but 
proving particular components does not guarantee the correct 
total. And of course, meanings are fluid . They change over 
time. And people can use them in unusual ways . The best we 
c an do 1s to say that in these particular contexts, this 
word means such and such. 
B. The Meaning of the Syntactic Frames: 
In this section, I have limited myself to 
examination of one particular syntactic construction, 
Xis {adj./past part. emotion term}+ preposition+ Y 
(Xis angry with Y, Xis frightened of Y, etc.) 
an 
where X 1s the human experiencer and Y is any entity, either 
human or non-human, which X sees as the cause/object/focus 
of X's emotion. The preposition serves to tell us something 
about the way in which the experiencer 1s considering the 
object. I have endeavoured to define the meanings of this 
syntactic construction when used with the following 
prepositions: 
by , with, at, about, of, to, for, over. 
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2. CASE STUDIES: EMOTION TERMS IN CONTEXT 
In this se c tion I e x plore the meaning and s y ntactic 
behaviour of sixteen emotion words. Each word 1s c onside r ed 
se parately , 1n context, and a definition 1s proposed . I am 
then 1n a posit ion to establish any 1 inks be tween · meaning 
and behaviour . In most cases I have done this by contrasting 
a word with other emotion words which are semantically 
c lo s ely related, and then relating differences in syntactic 
behaviour to different aspects of meaning. For this reason, 
I have considered the words in semantically-related groups, 
as f o llows: 
2 . l 
2.2 
2 . 3 
2 . 4 
2 . 5 
2.6 
ashamed, proud 
frightened, afraid, anxious 
guilty (feeling guilty/being guilty) 
sick and tired, fed up, irritated 
angry , annoyed, cross, furious 
outraged, indignant , offended. 
2.1 ASHAMED and PROUD 
2.1.1 ASHAMED 
Examples: a) Just as Dr Johnson thought that every man was 
s e c retly ashamed of not being a soldier, so Harold felt that 
every ba c helor was secretly ashamed of not being a husband 
and a father . 
(S.E.U. w16-5:137) Prose fiction) 
b) I'm not doing anything I'd be ashamed to tell 
my mother about. 
(ABC TV: A Very Peculiar Practice:19/8/89) 
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c} The fa c t that we have a c h i e ve d th e 1 o wes t 
level of (overseas) aid for more th a n twenty f ive y ea rs IS 
some thing Austral i ans, and the Hawk e Go v ernment I n 
particular , should be ashamed of. 
( C. T . 8/8/89: Letters to the Ed i tor ) 
d) Ye s terday the Prime Min is ter to l d a n 
Ar c hbishop he ought to be ashamed of himself and t hat he had 
b e en i n v olved in a c ampaign that was unchr i st ia n . 
( C. T . 23/6/90:2) 
e) Students (science graduates ) u s ed 
asham e d to go into the non - manufacturing s ector 
t o 
bu t 
be 
no w 
the bright ones join the service sector. 
Meaning : 
(Tokyo Institute of Technology : C.T .3 /12/89 : 2 9) 
X thinks this: 
1. People can know something (Y) about me . 
2. People may think something bad 
about me because of this. 
3. I don't want other people to know about 
Y. 
X feels something bad because of that . 
Discussion: In David Wi 11 iamson ' s play , The Removali s t , 
S imm o nds asks Ross what his father does for a living. Ross 
is obviously reluctant to answer , but, under pressure , 
admits his father is a carpenter. Simmonds identifies 
Ross's reluctance as shame, but is puzzled, because he sees 
nothing shameful about being a carpenter. 
Simmonds: Shouldn't be ashamed of y our old man 
because he's a carpenter. 
Ross: I'm not ashamed of him. 
(p.68) 
What Simmonds doesn't know 1s that Ross's father mak e s 
co ffins. Ross feels ashamed, not because he believes there 
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is anything intrin s i c all y bad about mak i n g coffins, bu t 
because he thinks i t c ould c ol o ur what p e op le t hink of h i m. 
He would prefer that p e op l e d i d n o t kn o w . 
1 . People can know something (Y) about me . I wan t to 
d e fine first the kinds of things whi c h ma y c au se pe o pl e t o 
be a s hamed. I find -
past actions (or acts of omission); 
I was ashamed I had damaged his beloved books . 
I am ashamed that I haven ' t visited my mother for a 
week. 
actions of others, with whom one feels some 
affiliation or for whom one accepts responsibility ; 
I was ashamed of my children ' s table manners . 
I was ashamed of the way Australians behaved in London . 
certain attributes - qualities, habits etc ; 
I am ashamed of my weight. 
I am ashamed that I can't swim. 
one's circumstances, past as well as present - job , 
family, education etc. 
I am ashamed of my grandmother . 
I am ashamed of my poor employment record . 
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In her discussion on the concept of ashamed, Wierzbicka has 
limited the scope of the concept to actions, and not simply 
actions, but "actions one should not do" . Her definition is 
X was ashamed= X felt as one does 
when one thinks that other people see that one has 
done something one should not do 
when one thinks that other people may think 
something bad of one because of that 
and when one wants to cease to be seen by other 
people because of that. 
(1986:592) 
I believe we can be ashamed of actions which people may 
consider odd or laughable, crying in front of TV, for 
instance but to describe such actions as something one 
should not do, is too strong. I would prefer to define them 
simply in terms of my second component - Other people may 
think something bad about me because of this. I would also 
add that things we can be ashamed of go beyond ac Lions to 
include attributes and circumstances our poverty-stricken 
childhood or the father who makes coffins. They may be 
things over which we have no control or for which we cannot 
be held responsible. Such matters are not of our doing, but 
1n public eyes they may contribute to the kind of person we 
are. 
The basis of our shame, then, may be summed up as 
J~y thing that goes to make up one's public image - whatever 
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people judge us by . What we feel shame about 1.s ourse lves, 
but it 1.s ourselves 1.n a par·ticular role, and that role 
depends on the eye of the beholder . If I am 1.n a foreign 
c ountry, and foreigners are accused of vandalism, then I 
will feel shame to the extent that I am identifed with those 
accu s ed, whether they be identified as Australians or 
backpackers or ignorant western tourists. 
I am ashamed of the way Australians behave in London 
but *I am ashamed of the way Germans behave in London. 
S o if aliens visit our planet and accuse us of destroying 
s ome vast ecosystem, presumably, if I accept their point, I 
would feel ashamed as a member of the human race. 
The shame we feel on behalf of others l. s not 
di s tinguished linguistically from the shame we feel about 
ourselves. I Harre describes a different situation for 
Spanish speakers. He writes: 
this. 
and 
A strong form exists in one culture of that which is 
weak in another. Most of us feel uncomfortable when we 
see someone, even a stranger, behaving foolishly, 
rudely or otherwise badly. Spaniards feel this emotion 
especially acutely, so acutely that it is treated as a 
distinct emotion, verguenza ajena (perhaps "alien" or 
"alienating shame"). Television programmes showing 
someone behaving badly can be almost unbearable to a 
Spaniard, owing to the force of verguenza aJena. 
2. 
a) 
b) 
(1986:11) 
People may think something bad about me because of 
Note the difference between 
I was embarrassed at being singled out for praise. 
*I was ashamed of being singled out for praise. 
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The latter is illogi c al. Shame requires that one ' s publi c 
image contain something bad. 
being singled out for praise. 
There 1s nothing bad about 
When people say "You should 
be ashamed of yourself", it 1s recognized as a rebuke. 
Ex amples c) and d) above are intended to make the recipients 
aware that they have done something bad. When I say "I am 
ashamed of myself", it is recognized as an admission of 
having done something bad. 
Another difference between embarrassed and ashamed is 
that while embarrassed depends on other people actually 
knowing about the situation/action for realization of the 
emotion, ashamed only requires us to admit the possibility 
that other people may come to know. Often we are secretly 
ashamed, as 1n example a) , because admitting shame 
presupposes the existence of something bad about ourselves. 
For the same reason, Ross denies that he 1s ashamed of his 
father. 
3. I don't want other people to know about Y. When we 
are ashamed of something, we want to hide it from public 
view. Wierzbicka has expressed this as 
one wants to cease to be seen by other people. 
This is adequate if one has been caught doing something bad. 
This assumes we are already in the public view. But what of 
the times when one 1s ashamed of one's dirty kitchen, or of 
one's mad uncle or one's Jewish blood? Isn't it the 
kitchen, the mad uncle, the fact of our Jewishness, which we 
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wish to keep hidden? Ashamed requires only the possibility 
that others will come to know. To include potential causes 
of shame, we need to express our emotion not as a physical 
reaction to another action, but as a feeling that applies in 
a more general sense. 
2.1.2 PROUD 
Examples: a) The Navy guy at the Jervis Bay display 1n 
Civic is very proud of the satellite map of the area. 
(C.T. 1/9/89:3) 
b) I don't feel particularly proud of what I've 
done. 
(Williamson: Jugglers Three:227) 
c) M,v mom was crying at work when she heard that 
I was here 1n Panama with my twin sister, but she's pretty 
proud of us now, I guess. 
(First female U.S. soldier in a combat role: 
C.T. 4/1/90:9) 
d) The children of a Canadian friend were 
through most of their childhood because 
to the notorious outlaw, Jesse James. 
(C.T. 10/2/90: B4) 
delighted and proud 
they were related .. 
Meaning: X thinks this: 
1 . People 
2. People 
about 
3 . I want 
can know something ( y) about 
may think something good 
me because of this. 
other people to know about Y. 
X feels something good because of that. 
me. 
Discussion: 1 . People can know something ( Y) about me. 
Whatever we are proud of must reflect on us in some way. It 
can be something we have done, or that our children or 
students or troops or pet mice or any other agent with whom 
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we identify have don e. It c an a l so be something we ar e, 
Irish or blue-e ye d or descended from Pe t er the Great . 
The c onnection wi th self 1s essential . 
*I am proud of all this beautiful ra.1n we ' re getting . 
(I c an claim no part in its happening) 
I was proud when Australia won the fifth test. 
(becaus e I identify with an Australian team 1n contrast to 
their opponents. This would be particularly so if the test 
were played 1n, s ay, Pakistan, and if I were one of the few 
Australian spectators . ) 
but 
~I was proud when Greg Norman won the Australian Open . 
(Here I have no . c onnection with Greg Norman as opposed to 
other Australian competitors . I could have felt proud if we 
were related, or had belonged to the same club , or gone to 
the same school.) 
2. People may think something good about me because of 
that. If I am Greg Norman's first golf coach , then 
presumably I feel proud when Greg Norman wins the Australian 
Open, but my pride 1s because I believe other people will 
judge the action as good, and judge me as a skilled coach . 
When people say, "You must be very proud of her", the 
impli c ation 1s 
a) she did something good; 
b) the addressee can share some of the credit . 
but the judgment is in the eye of the beholder. 
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3. I want other people -to know about this . 
If Wierzbicka agrees that ashamed and proud are mirror 
i ma g e s of each other, then presumably she favours the 
c omponent -
One wants to be seen by other people 
for proud. ( cf ashamed - One wants to cease to be seen b y 
other people). For the same reasons that I have given in my 
discussion of ashamed, I prefer the more explicit I want 
other people to know about this . 
On a historical note, "pride" has a past that stretches 
back to early Christian times , when it was included as one 
of the chief vices or cardinal sins. Whatever the modern 
word may retain of its old meaning, it is interesting that 
it seems to have lost all bad connotations. 
2.1.3 Aspects of Syntactic Behaviour of Ashamed and Proud: 
1. The Adjective form: As I argue in my definitions, proud 
and ashamed are the positive and negative counterparts of 
the same concept. Their definitions differ only in that 
proud has good and I want where ashamed has bad and I don't 
want . If my definitions are correct, then any difference 1n 
s yntactic behaviour will be due to this single difference in 
meaning. One might expect these two words to have similar 
g rammatical properties, and as adjectives they do. Both are 
pure adjectives, not past participles. The only preposition 
that can follow either 1s of. However, if I examine the 
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behaviour of the noun and verb forms of these words, I find 
some differences : 
1. 
2 . 
a) 
b) 
He is proud of his local knowledge. 
He prides himself on his local knowledge. 
c) He takes pride in his local knowledge . 
a) He is ashamed of his local knowledge. 
b) ~He shames himself on his local knowledge. 
c) ~He takes shame in his local knowledge. 
2 . The verb form: Both pride and shame are transitive, 
with restrictions on the nature of the object. While pride 
c an only be a reflexive, shame can only take a direct object 
that is person other than self. Their (human only) objects 
are in complementary distribution: 
a) I pride myself on my children's behaviour. 
b) -•I shame myself on my children's behaviour. 
c) I shamed the others into helping. 
d) •I prided the others into helping. 
2.1 The reflexive verb construction (pride oneself on): 
The reflexive verb construction 1s worth a closer look. 
There are a number of emotion terms (normally past 
participles proud is an exception) where the experiencer 
is the patient -
I am upset 
I am worried 
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I am contented 
I a.m satisfied 
Ia.ma.ma.zed 
I am proud 
but which can be expressed as reflexive verbs, where the 
experiencer is also agent: 
I upset myself by reading his letters a.ga.1n. 
I worried myself sick over his telephone ca.11. 
I contented myself with sending a. postcard. 
I satisfied myself' t ha. t the place was secure. 
I amazed myself by running four kilometres. 
I prided myself on m.Y clean house. 
In such cases it is not the discovery of a situation or the 
impact of an event that causes my emotion, but our 
deliberately recreating the event or dwelling on the 
situation. The experiencer X behaves syntactically as an 
active participant because s/he has chosen to think about 
the situation in his/her own time, and not · in the heat of 
the moment. 
Wierzbicka has commented on a similar syntactic pattern 
in Russian emotion terms: 
When emotion words (in Russian) are conceptualized 1n 
terms of reflexive ve1·bs they a.re treated not as 
arising by themselves but as ca.used by the speakers' 
conscious thoughts a.bout the event. 
(from Semantics, Culture and Cognition: 
forthcoming) 
The prepositions used in the above examples also offer a 
clue as to our conceptualizations. In sentences like 
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I pride myself on my skill. 
I congratulate myself on my escape . 
my emotion 1S constructed on the basis of personal 
achievement. The frame X verbs himself on his Y signals 
something like: 
l . X did something good (Y). (i.e. not just an 
action but a completed action, an achievement) 
2. X feels something good about himself because of 
that. 
3. X wants to think about Y at other times and feel 
the same. 
In contrast, shame can only be followed by into: 
Here, 
I shame others into helping. 
I coax others into helping. 
I bully others into h~lping. 
shame is seen as a tool, a means to an end, a 
motivating emotion. X verbs others into doing Y signals 
something like: 
3. 
X does something to Z 
to cause Z to do Y. 
The noun form: TAKE+ NP (take pride in) 
There are a number of take+ emotion constructions: 
take pride (pleasure, delight, JOY, satisfaction, an 
interest) IN 
take fright (offence, umbrage) (AT) - the 
prepositional phrase is optional 
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take hope (c ourage , heart) FROM 
take a liking , ( a shine , a fan cy, a d is l i ke ) TO 
take pit y ON 
and a mo re marginal emotion term - take care OF . 
Let u s contrast these verbal c onstructions 
adjective or past participle constructions : 
.,v,.· takes pr i de 1. n (doing) YI X 1. s proud of Y 
X took offence at YI X was offended by Y 
X took courage from YI X Was encouraged by Y 
.,\'.' took a 1 i k i ng to YI .,'{ 1 i k e d Y 
X took pi t y on YI .,\' pi ti e d Y 
){ took care of YI X cared for Y . 
with thei r 
The first three constructions enable the exper1encer to be 
"agent" rather than patient . But agent in what sense? The 
e motion felt is expressed as action, whether intentional (I 
take pride 1.n polishing the doorknocker) or seemingly 
involuntary (He took fright when I threw the firecracker) . 
The last three, which are alternatives for constructions 
where the experiencer 1s already the subject of an emotion 
verb, show the action not as habitual but as a new 
initiative, where the exper1encer 1s acting to express his 
new found emotion. 
I define X takes NP (em.) as: 
1. X felt something. 
2. X did something because of that. 
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The IN group (pleasure, pride, delight, JOY, satisfaction. 
an interest) appears to be restricted to positive emotions. 
They are exemplified by: 
a) He takes pride in keeping his lawn immaculate. 
b) He takes great delight in teasing the dog. 
c ) He takes pleasure in showing the children how to do 
card tricks. 
d) He took satisfaction in telling her just what he 
thought of her. 
e) He took an interest in her son's progress. 
but not 
f) •He took shame in admitting his error. 
g} ~I take sorrow in recalling my grandfather. 
h) ~I take displeasure in working overtime. 
A maJor difference between the in construction and the 
others 1s the location of the experiencer with reference to 
the object NP. When I take pride in maintaining an 
immaculate lawn, I take pride and I maintain the lawn. The 
two activities are co-referential. When I take offence at 
her remarks, or take courage f rem his supper t, however , 
someone else makes the remarks and provides the support . 
With the in emotions, then, the experiencer willingly 
enters into an activity because of its rewards . The 
a c t i v i t y o f taking em o t ion in i s b o th po s i t i v e 1 y e v a 1 u a t e d 
and volitional . 
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I suggest the following definition for the frame 
X takes NP(em.) in (doi~g) Y: 
1. X does something (Y) 
because X feels something good when he does Y. 
(The take emotion AT contruction 1s explored further 1n my 
discussions of frightened and offended.) 
Both constructions explored above, the reflexive verb 
(.\' prides himself on) and the take + NP construction (X 
takes pride in) , involve verbs where the agent acts 
intentionally. We actively seek out and nurture positive 
feelings of pride but not shame. The former contribute to 
one's feelings of self-worth. Averill writes, 
When we wish to assume credit for a response, it will 
be attributed to the self-as-agent; on the other hand, 
if we wish to deny responsibility, one way to do this 
is by interpreting the response as a passion rather 
than as an action." 
(1982:22) 
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2.2 FRIGHTENED, AFRAID, ANXIOUS 
2.2.1 FRIGHTENED 
Examples: a ) To day Oscar would not look at his father. He 
was frightened of what those e y es would re v eal . 
(Carey : 19) 
b) "Are y ou frightened about tonight ? " I a s ked 
Ha ppy . Happy looked at me for a moment and then wa s h e d 
th e s au s age he was chewing down with a cup of coffee . " It 's 
goo d to be a litle frightened. It ' s good to respe c t yo ur 
o pp onent . " 
(Courtenay:88) 
c) He and his father frightened Mrs Williams by 
di sc ussing famous murders in c alm and adult detail . 
(Carey:34) 
[ am a 
we ek . 
d) I haven't done any typing for three weeks and 
bit frightened about the class I am going to this 
(S . E.U.w7.32:190 - Letters, social) 
e) I never realized how huge the task was , and I 
wa s a little frightened because I realized it was to o 
mammoth a task for me. 
(C.T. 31/1/90 : 25) 
Meaning: X thinks this: 
1 . Something bad could happen to me here a 
short time after now. 
2. I don't know what I can do. 
3. I don't want to be here. 
X feels something bad because of that. 
Discussion: Before I can justify my definition , there is 
s omething about the meaning of the emotion terms which take 
o f (ashamed, proud , envious, Jealous, guilty , terrified , 
scared , frightened , afraid) which needs to be clarified . 
Most are capable of two different interpretations - namely , 
t hey can sometimes indicate what I am feeling at a gi v en 
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moment, and sometimes simply describe my attitude towards 
something, without any reference to my present emotional 
state. 
The former 
exemplified by: 
the "felt at this moment" emotions 
a) I feel proud of my son standing up there. 
b) I was so jealous of my sister when she won . 
c ) I am too frightened · of her to answer. 
are 
In these , the emotion term refers to an actual event when X 
made a cognitive appraisal and felt something. They 
normally have this meaning when used without their object 
1.. e . I feel ashamed, I am frightened, and so on, when they 
are understood to relate to something 1.n their present 
c ontext . In these cases, it would be appropriate to use 
either feel or be before the emotion term. Feeling X, as 
Ortony and Clore have pointed out (1989: 127-8), focusses on 
the experiential, phenomenal aspects of an emotion. Our 
understanding that an of emotion term can relate to a 
particular moment is also guided by such things as a 
reference to a specific instance, as in b) above, and by 
modifiers like so, very and too, as 1 n C ) above, which point 
to a real rather than a hypothetical reaction. 
The second interpretation using the same or similar 
emotion terms to indicate a general attitude is 
exemplified by: 
a) I am proud of my Welsh ancestry. 
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b) I am envious of people who can sing well . 
c) I am afraid of Georie/spiders/the dark. 
We are describing our attitude to something, without 
necessarily implying anything about our present emotional 
state. 
Most of the of emotion terms can be used in either 
sense. I suggest that frightened and afraid are exceptions 
to this - that they provide lexical means of distinguishing 
the present emotion state (frightened) from the general 
attitude (afraid) . (Guilty is also an exception, although a 
different distinction is made. Although feeling guilty 
refers to the present, being guilty does not describe a 
general attitude. See my separate discussion on guilty.) 
Justification for my definition of frightened is as 
follows: 
1. Something bad could happen to me here a short time 
after now. We can be frightened by or at something that is 
happening to us at a particular moment ( the spider on the 
bathroom ceiling, the threatening telephone call). Here we 
a r·e· concerned w i th a par t i cu 1 a r s i t u a t i on . Our emotion 
occurs because the present event represents the likelihood 
of some future danger - something that will affect our well-
being. 
state. 
We need to separate the trigger from the resultant 
The spider on the bathroom ceiling is the trigger. 
What we are frightened of is the possibility that it will 
drop on us, bite us, or in some way threaten us. In 
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situations where the triggering situation l. s physically 
present, that comes to be the focus of our emotion. 
it However, l. s the future that l. s the real cause of our 
r,oncern. Often, the belief that we are going to be in a 
threatening situation - as 1.n examples b) and d) above 1.s 
a sufficient trigger. 
some thing wi 11 happen; 
We are frightened by our belief that 
we are frightened of the potential 
happening. The two events, the trigger and the resultant 
state, the actual and the potential, normally are not 
distinguished when we are frightened. The one represents 
the other. Afraid lacks this link with cause (*I am afraid 
by you) or moment (*I am af1·aid at it). When we are afraid, 
we can only be afraid of something the potential 
happening. There 1.s no by or at link with anything 1n our 
present situation. 
When we have a pair of semantically similar words, one 
of which 1.s a past participle and the other an adjective, as 
with frightened/afraid, or annoyed/angry, or pleased/happy, 
the past participle tends to refer to an emotion whose 
timing 1.s closely linked to its cause. 
I was frightened when the engine began to falter. 
while the adjective 1.s more likely to describe a resultant 
state that continues after the triggering event has ceased -
I am afraid of flying. 
In our minds frightened 1.s related to a fright, which 
involves an instinctive, muscular Jump. When we get a 
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fright, we expect that the actual threat may follow the 
warning sign almost instantly. We hear the squeal of 
brakes, and we barely have time to leap aside. To be 
frightened is to experience a sudden surge of emotion, with 
physiological changes that help us to cope with an immediate 
danger. In contrast, afraid lacks a noun form. Fear, an 
apparently unrelated word, fills this role. A fright is a 
distinct, countable event. We can get a fright, or give 
so meone a fright. Fears, however, are countable only 
according to the number of kinds. They do not refer to 
events. 
here a short time after now: The immediate context to which 
frightened refers is perhaps best expressed broadly by " . 1. n 
this situation". Usually we can identify the present 
sit uation in terms of here and now. However, there will be 
occasions when the two notions of time and place will not 
coincide. For instance, I can be frightened . by the news 
that an outbreak of hostilities 1n the Middle East is 
imminent. ( I can feel frightened even though I am on the 
other side of the world. It 1s what the immediate future 
may bring that concerns me). 
3. I don't want to be here. Typically, when we are 
frightened, our heartbeat increases and our muscles tense . 
The body is ready for flight. Things that cause me to be 
frightened threaten my physical well-being. Immediate 
physical danger can possibly be avoided by moving away 
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quickly. It might be argued that the idea of "here" 
unnecessarily restri c ts our definition to our immediate 
physical surroundings. In this component I use here to 
refer metaphorically to the present situation. I can be 
frightened, for instance, by the threat of being sacked. I 
don't want to be in this threatening situation. We may feel 
the same heightened tension as if we were poised for flight, 
even though physical flight 1s here irrelevant. 
1.1 Syntactic behaviour of frightened: TAKE FRIGHT AT: 
Our language permits us both to be frightened (where 
the experiencer is acted upon) 
exper1encer 1s doing something) 
or to take fright (where the 
To take, and to give, are 
normally used to describe voluntary acts. 
however. is hardly voluntary. 
Taking fright. 
M.Y horse took fright when a rabbit shot out of some 
bushes a few yards 1n front of us. 
The exper1encer 1s cast 1n an "active" role, but active need 
not mean "intentional". (Cf. I lost my Job. I caught 
mumps. ) Here, the horse 1s active 1n the sense that we are 
describing what he 1s doing rather than what 1s happening to 
him. Its largely involuntary response . 1s conceptualized not 
as a feeling (for which an adjective or a passive verb would 
be appropriate), but as an action, or rather, a reaction. 
We imagine the horse as swerving away or rearing. 
Contrast: 
a) He was frightened when she proposed. 
with b) He got frightened when she proposed. 
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and C) He took fright when she proposed. 
a) He was frightened when she proposed: lS a passive 
response. It may be purely cognitive, without active 
o v e t· t on e s . 
b) He got frightened when she proposed: indicates that a 
recognizable physical state has been reached. cf. got 
upset, got excited, got angry, got depressed (got sick, got 
cold, got tired) but not :tgot pleased, :tgot delighted etc. 
He got very happy refers to someone who has reached a happy 
state of inebriation . 
c ) He took fright when she proposed: 
(he fled?). 
implies further action 
Yet there seems to be more than mere physical reaction 
involved. If a spider falls on me, I would get a fright 
rather than take fright, even though I have no doubt I would 
make a strong physical reaction. So what is the difference 
between my reaction and that of the horse which takes fright 
when the rabbit darts out of the undergrowth. Let us take a 
look at some more acceptable take fright at constructions: 
a) When the price was mentioned, he took fright. 
b) She took fright at the size of the audience . 
c) He took fright when she proposed. 
In each case, we · understand that the experiencer decides to 
take evasive action as a result of suddenly becoming aware 
39 
• 
of a threat to himself/herself. There must be an interval 
of time between the awareness of threat and its happening 
(this was lacking when the spider fell on me) to permit 
ar,tion to be taken. So al though I described the horse· s 
action as involuntary, a human response is not totally so. 
We make certain evaluative judgments -
a) that a threat exists, 
and b) that we can avoid it by doing something . 
I would explicate take fright (at) as 
X thinks: 
1 . Something bad could happen to me here a short 
time after now. 
2. I don't want to be here. 
X does something because of that. 
2.2.2 AFRAID 
Examples: a) She knew he was afraid of the sea. He 
carried his fear coiled and tangled in him. 
still some 
And these 
afraid. 
(Carey:17) 
b) Among the 2000 Bei Jing graduates there were 
who "we 1· e s 1 ow in making an i de o 1 o g i ca 1 tu r 11 " • 
are the students of which China 's 1 eaders are 
(C.T.19/8/89:9) 
c) There a1·e· a lot of problems in reintroducing 
a large predator that 1.s captive-bred. For one thirig, 
people are afraid of them. 
(C.T.24/8/89:6) 
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d) Perhaps, as a professor at Toronto [~iversity 
suggested to me recently, it is because for all their 
newfound confidence, Canadians are still afraid to probe too 
deeply. 
(S.E.U.wll.4:173 - General non-fiction) 
e) Liz has never been afraid of flying. 
(C.T. 17/7/90:2) 
Meaning: X thinks this: 
1 . Something bad could happen to me when I 
am with Y. 
2. I don't know what I can do. 
3. I don't want to be with Y. 
X feels something bad because of that. 
Discussion: 1. Something bad could happen to me when I am 
with Y. This is a generalized statement, applying to all 
such times that may occur. Compare this with the first 
component of frightened -
Some.thing bad could happen to me here a short time 
after now. 
which applies only to the present situation. 
afraid of the dark, of spiders, of heights. 
People may be 
They create an 
abstraction of all the times when they have been frightened. 
We count our fears not according to how often they occur, 
but according to the number of kinds. 
I was frightened by a snake when I was ten, and now I 
am afraid of snakes. 
We would not say 
~ I was afraid of a snake when I was ten 
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if we were referring to one event. It would be acceptable 
only if we were referring to a general attitude to one 
special snake. 
3. I don't want to be with Y. Where frightened 1s 
concerned with imminent danger, and has the component I 
don't want to be here, afraid is concerned with any 
potential occasion where Y is present, regardless of the 
present situation. Y is the source of our fear. 
2.1 Aspects of syntactic behaviour of afraid: 
An examination of the ways in which we use afraid and 
frightened provides linguistic evidence that afraid always 
requires an identified focus (afraid of the dark, afraid of 
sna ke s), while frightened, because it already has the 
present situation as its context, can stand alone as a 
description of a self-contained state. regardless of its 
ob ject. 
For instance, afraid behaves unusually as an adjective 
1n that it never precedes its noun -
•When I opened the door I was met by an afraid child. 
When I opened the door I was met by a frightened child. 
The child was afraid begs the question Afraid of what? 
Frightened, being partly verbal, is more closely linked with 
whatever 1s happening at that time. 1. e. the cause of the 
e motion 1s more likely to be apparent from the situation. 
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In such case, by saying He 1. s frightened we are drawing 
attention to his phy s ical and -emotional state rather than to 
the object of his fright. 
This lS also borne out by an examinat~ o n 
prepositions which follow 
a) I was frightened 
b) 1 was frightened 
c) 1 am frightened 
and trembling.) 
but 
the two words: 
by the explo s ion. 
at the news . 
of Ge orge . (That's 
c) ~[ was afr a id by the explosion . 
d) •I wRs afraid at the news. 
why I 
of the 
am pale 
I am afraid of George. (I have been for years.) 
We could theoretically place a comma before by or at 1n 
sep t e nces a) and b), and it would serve to emphasize our 
emotional state. The noun phrase is simply the trigger: 
f) I am frightened, at the news coming from Iraq. 
This is not possible with of. 
term and of is much tighter: 
The link between the emotion 
g) ~I am afraid, of the situation 1.n Iraq. 
A third point of difference 1s highlighted by the 
following: 
a) She is afraid to go to work. 
b) ~She is too afraid to go to work. 
c) She is too frightened to go to work. 
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a) refers to a general attitude. c) refers to her present 
emotional state. In b) there is a conflict between the 
general and the specific. For the same reason, we avoid 
* very afraid. We cannot modify a general attitude as if it 
were a specific reaction to a particular situation. 
Note: Afraid has a secondary meaning in English, that 
now appears to be more common than the straightforward 
emotion term. It occurs in a number of different speech 
functions. 
The expression, I'm afraid, may occur in disagreements -
I ' m afraid I don ' t agree with you. 
in expressions of regret -
I'm afraid I can't help you. 
in refusals -
Can you come over? 
I'm afraid not. 
and even in confirmation 
I hear you ve lost your Job. 
I'm afraid so. 
Is that right? 
I'm afraid serves as a kind of pragmatic marker , often used 
apologetically, warning that bad news is to follow. In my 
data from the Survey of English Usage, I have thirty six 
examples of afraid, twenty eight of which are used in this 
apologetic way. It would appear that its apologetic meaning 
has evolved as a shortened form of I'm afraid to tell you 
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2.2.3 ANXIOUS 
Anxious provides us with another example of a word 
where a secondary meaning seems to be overtaking its primary 
one. (See also afraid) . Anxious ( 1) is the state akin to 
worried I am anxious about my son. Anxious ( 2) means 
something like eager I am anxious to meet yo ur sister . 
The Survey of English Usage lists twenty six examples in 
con text. In sixteen of these, anxious has the eager· 
meaning . 
On closer examination, however, the two senses have a 
lot in common. Both require 
a) some sort of future goal; 
and b) an awareness of possible difficulties in that 
regard. 
In a sentence like I am anxious (eager) to get home before 
dark, the relationship with anxious (1) is clear, because we 
recognize that there could well be dangers in such a 
si tuation. However, when anxious (2) is given a context 
with no apparent difficulties I am anxious to meet your 
sister the relationship with anxious ( 1 ) is not so 
obvious. 
The difference would appear to be one of emphasis. 
Depending upon the construction we use we can choose to 
emphasize either that we are considering the potential 
difficulties of a situation, where the well-being of 
s omething is an implicit goal, (anxious (1) worried) or 
45 
focussing on the goal itself, (anxious (2) eager) . 
Anxious (1) 1s typically followed by about, denoting the 
centre of our field of focus - the "patient" whose future we 
are co ncerned about -
Doctors remained anxious about the child's condition 
for several hours. 
Anxious (2) can only be followed by a complement clause, 
defining the precise goal -
a) Wi 11 Unilever, alive to the situation and in any 
to get a foothold in tissues , step in first? 
((S.E.U. wl2.6:8 - Press, news) 
e ·vent anxious 
b) He 
main road, 
for it. 
is now very anxious to return to the University 
and I have not the slightest doubt of his fitness 
(S.E.U. wl7.2:247) 
c) But King Hussein cannot count on Saudi Arabia and 
Syria, which he is most anxious to win over . 
(S.E.U. wl2.3:27 - Press, news) 
To facilitate comparison with afraid and frightened, 
however, I have restricted the following discussion to 
anxious (1). 
ANXIOUS (1) 
Examples: a) As he is particularly anxious about the 
prognos 1. s I thought that as we are now fortunate enough to 
have Professor N on the staff I would refer him to his 
Outpatients for his op1n1on. 
(S.E.U. w?.12:313 - Business letters) 
b) But if you're anxious, the best thing would 
be for me to take him straight back to London. 
(S.E.U. wl6.l:302 - Prose fiction) 
c) "And now the weather, Captain," the Chairman 
sa id, just a shade anxiously. 
(S.E.U. wl6.4:238 - Prose fiction) 
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Meaning: X thinks this: 
1. Bad things - could happen to Y 
2. I don't want this. 
3. I want only good things to happen to Y. 
4. I don't know if I can cause bad things 
not to happen. 
X feels something bad because of that. 
Discussion: 1 . Bad things could happen to Y. Anxious is 
concerned with the possibility of a range of bad things 
happening, ra~her than with one specific event. 
happen, but various things are possible . 
I am anxious about my son . 
~ I am anxious that he could fail. 
Nothing may 
While frightened and afraid are concerned with what 
will happen to the experiencer (tome), anxious has no such 
restriction on the recipient. One can be anxious about 
anything at all - the future of the planet, the Middle East 
situation, one's health. All that is necessary is that the 
object of one's anxiety should potentially have a future. 
•I am anxious about the Vietnam War. 
Let us examine the differences in the first components 
of the definitions of these three similar words: 
frightened: Something bad could happen to me a short 
time after now. 
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afraid: Something bad could happen to me when I am 
with Y. 
anxious: Bad things could happen to Y. 
While frightened links the emotion to the pre s ent situat i on 
( a s hort time after now), and afraid links it to t h e 
pre s en c e of some particular object or situation ( when I am 
with Y) , anx1ous relates to a range of situations that e x i s t 
onl y within our imagination. They require no further 
de finition beyond centring on Y 1n the future. 
2. I don't want this. Regardless of who or what is at 
risk , I am con c erned. 
th e well - being of Y . 
I must have some vested interest -1n 
Again, let us compare the relevant 
co mp o nents of frightened and afraid: 
frightened: I don 't want to be here. 
afraid: I don ' t want to be with Y. 
Both of these presuppose the existence of something that 
t hreatens , and want not to be 1n the same place as that . 
With anxious, whatever threatens has no concrete existence . 
What we imagine are possible events, not their perceived 
source. 
3 . I want only good things to happen to Y. This 
c omponent 1s the link between anxious (1) and anxious (2 ). 
Implicit 1n our concern for what may happen to Y 1s a 
c on c ern for Y's well-being. It is our unstated goal. 
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4. I don't know if I can cause bad things not to 
happen. All three emotions share a feeling of powerlessness 
about the future . For frightened and afraid , I ha v e 
ex pr e s s ed this as I don't know what I can do . My 
e xpe c tations of the threat eventuating are higher for these 
two than they are for anxious. When I am frightened or 
afraid I think something will happen to me, given a 
parti c ular situation. The threat of something is perceived 
as very real, with a recognizable form. I must act , but I 
. don ' t know what to do except run away. For anxious, the 
threat is still just a number of possibilities without 
parti c ular form. Nothing may happen . If I have the chance 
to act, it could be to forestall any action rather than to 
wonder how I will react. 
2.2.4 Aspects of syntactic behaviour of frightened, afraid 
and . anx.1.ous: 
The syntactic properties of these words can provide 
s upporting evidence for my definitions. 
only frightened is a past participle . 
lack even a corresponding verb form. 
Of the three words , 
Indeed, the other two 
Only frightened can 
be followed by by or at, and thus given a time dimension 
relative to some event . Afraid and anxious refer to states 
that lack this time dimension. They can be used to refer to 
long-term states or attitudes. 
She knew he was afraid of the sea. 
(Carey:17) 
Many thanks for referring this rather anxious 
introspective patient whose chief problem seems to be 
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his•concern about possible development of crippling 
arthritis in his fingers. 
(S.E.U. w?.14:151 - Letters, business) 
The following prepositions also tell us something about 
the meaning of the terms. For instance, I can be frightened 
of George or afraid of George, but not *anxious of George. 
Of implies a relationship with something that directly 
affects the experiencer. ( See my discussion of of in Ch. 3). 
The object of my emotion is ~hus seen as the source of the 
bad happening. 
The only preposition that can follow anxious is about -
I can be anx1.ous about Geor 0 ·e 0 I but not *frightened about 
George or *afraid about George. About 1s used when we want 
to indicate a range of possibilities existing round a 
central identified point or situation. I have expressed 
this plurality as bad things. Thus the object of our 
anxiety is the recipient of the possible bad happenings, and 
not the source. 
Of the two adjectives, only anxious lS used 
adverbially. It could well be more common as an adverb than 
an adjective. Anxiously awaiting has reached the status of 
a cliche. The fact that afraid has no adverbial form would 
seem to lend weight to my argument that afraid has meaning 
only when linked to a specific object, (afraid of the dark) 
and cannot be used independently of this to describe the 
manner of an action. 
*He opened the door afraid (afraidly?). 
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2.3 GUILTY 
First, it is important t ·o recognize that guilty is not 
always an emotion term. If I say Xis guilty of neglecting 
his c hild. this is a judgment that someone has committed 
some offence. There is no reference to the emotional state 
of the subject. I can be guilty of driving an unregistered 
c ar and, although I am aware of breaking a law, feel no 
guilt at all. I may simply not care. But if I say I feel 
guilty about leaving my baby with a babysitter all day, this 
J.S a reference to my emotional state. With most emotion 
terms, feeling .,'{ is a part of being }{. I cannot be angry or 
frightened or sad without feeling angry or frightened or 
sad. Ortony and Clore have written: 
The experienced feeling is part of the emotion, but not 
the emotion itself. The emotion is the whole package, 
of which the feeling is a necessary but not sufficient 
component. To say that one feels angry is to focus 
on the experiential, phenomenal aspects of an emotion. 
( 1989: 127,128) 
When it comes to gui 1 ty, however, feeling gui 1 ty is not a 
necessary part of being guilty. When I say I am guilty I am 
when I say I feel g·ui 1 ty, I making a legal/moral judgment: 
am talking about my emotional state. 
Ortony (1987) uses guilty and abandoned as examples of 
instances when English speakers tend to equate (and thus 
confuse) an emotional state with its cause. He suggests 
that the feeling form is an elliptical way of expressing a 
more complex idea -
feeling x can be expanded into something 
as one typically feels when one believes 
and cares that one is x". (1987:284) 
51 
1 ike "feeling 
that one 1s x 
The 
emotion. 
following discussion relates to guilt as an 
Examples: a) One mother was torn because her eight-year-old 
refused to allow her time with her new husband. She felt 
guilty about resenting the child's intrusion . 
(C.T. 5/12/89:15) 
b) Cheryl (mother of 6-month-old quintuplets) 
still feels guilty about causing her mother so much work . 
(N.I. 9/9/89) 
c) He now admits that the bond (with his step-
children) is stronger than with his own children something 
he says he doesn't feel guilty about. 
(C.T. 5/12/89:15) 
d) We should all feel guilty for condoning what 
has been done to our rainforests in the name of development. 
may 
wife , 
c uts! 
e) In a second marriage, the husband's 
feel gui 1 ty about showing affection towards 
out of a sense of loyalty to their mother. 
children 
the new 
f) No need to feel guilty about taking those tax 
(C.T. Headline: 8/10/89) 
g) I enjoyed looking at the goods on sale 
but I felt guil t,Y at taking up the shop assistants' time 
when I had no intention of buying anything. 
(ATESOL Journal 1989 (2) :8) 
Meaning: X thinks this: 
1 . I did something bad. 
(or I did something. Something bad 
happened because of this.) 
2. I shouldn't have done it. 
3. I am bad. 
X feels something bad because of that. 
Discussion: 1. I did something bad. (or I did something. 
Something bad happened because of this.) Guilt is always 
ca used by an action (or an act of omission). If an act ion 
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is not directly expressed, 
situation. 
it will 
I f e 1 t g u i 1 t .Y a b o u t my fa i 1 u re . 
be implicit in the 
(I failed.) 
This component may be expanded to include instances when I 
c aused something bad to happen. (I did something. Something 
bad happened because of this.) Often the wrong-doing is an 
accidental or unforeseen byproduct of one s action . For 
instance. in example b) above, what Cheryl did was to have 
quintuplets. What she feels guilty about is not having the 
babies but causing her mother so much work. There is a 
causal link between her action and the bad outcome. 
The action must be recognized by X as bad. 
acceptable. a) 
b) 
I felt guilty about failing is 
I felt guilty about succeeding makes sense only if 
we believe the success has been in some way bad. 
it caused trouble.) 
I am the agent. 
(Perhaps 
To feel The action must be mine. 
guilty 1s to believe oneself, to some extent at least. 
responsible for the event in question. 
collective guilt: 
My guilt may be a 
a) I feel guilty about Australia's continued refusal 
to give aid to Vietnam. 
b) I feel guilty about our treatment of Aborigines 1n 
the past. 
but I feel guilt only to the extent that I identify with 
those responsible. 
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So 
lS 
C ) *I feel guilty about the violence 1.n Northern 
Ireland. 
impossible if I do not identity with the people 
responsible. 
2. I shouldn't have done this. Ortony's I believe 
that I am X (guilty) corresponds to I think this: I did 
something bad. What is needed now 1s an I care that I am X 
component that will convert being guilty into feeling 
guilty. 
I was guilty of speeding, but I had no regrets. 1s 
acceptable. 
~I felt guilty about speeding, but I had no regrets. 
1s impossible. 
3. I am bad. 
blame and regret. 
The first two components involve self-
These alone do not necessarily constitute 
guilt. 
Compare a) 
b) 
I felt guilty about deceiving my mother. 
with ?I felt guilty about wearing my old shoes to 
the party. 
I blame myself for wearing the wrong shoes and I certainly 
regret making a fool of myself like that, but one would not 
normally expect to feel guilt for something so trivial. When 
I feel guilty, I judge myself 1n the harshest possible 
light. I condemn not the act, but myself. Solomon writes -
What distinguishes guilt (from shame), however, is its 
ability to encompass the sense of worth of the whole 
person; in guilt, one does not reproach himself only 
for this particular transgression but rather reproaches 
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himself in general, as if his very existence 1s an 
offense as well as any particular action. 
(1977:318) 
I agree here with Solomon ' s assessment of guilt, (although, 
unlike Solomon, I consider that shame also encompasses the 
sense of worth of the whole person - Viz. I am ashamed of 
myself). Guilt tends to involve not just admitting to 
oneself that one has done something wrong , but dwelling at 
length on the fact that this is the way one is. It is thus 
more likely to be a long-term state than an immediate 
response to an action. Whether or not I have committed a 
ma J o r c t' 1 me , my a c t i on t ends to obs e s s me . This knowledge 
is a burden I must carry. I dwell on it , constantly 
reinforcing the link in my own mind. 
Un like ashamed, guilt lacks the component I don't want 
people to know I did Y. In examples such as the following -
She blamed herself for her son -' s death and c arried her 
guilt for the rest of her life 
what others think does not matter. What she bears is a 
private burden. 
It would seem that depending on whether we use the word 
as an emotion term or not, the following prepositions also 
vary: 
a) John 1s guilty of cheating. 
b) ~John 1s guilty about cheating. 
c) ~John feels guilty of cheating. 
d) John feels guilty about cheating. 
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We can say John feels guilty to refer to his present 
emotion state. But John is guilty does not refer to John ' s 
long~term attitude in the way John is afraid of snakes does. 
Rather it has acquired a specialized legal/moral meaning 
that has nothing to do with emotion, but depends on the 
judgment of others. 
When we comp a r e b ) and d ) we f i n d to be g u i 1 t ,v and 
about are incompatible. Factual guilt (being guilty) 
depends on . someones (not necessarily the patient's) 
awareness of some sort of rule or standard that one has 
broken (guilty of manslaughter, of neglect, of not paying 
one's library fines). One's focus must be on the broken 
s tandard and not its circumstances or repercussions. 
d) We were guilt.T,-- of speeding. 
e} ~We were guilty about speeding. 
When we feel guilty, the underlying principle that has been 
violated can often be difficult to identify ·and articulate. 
A parent may feel guilty about having a handicapped child. 
S/he may not know precisely why s/he feels this way. There 
is simply the feeling that the bad event may have been 
caused by something s/he did. One's prime concern is not 
with what one has done but with its apparent consequences. 
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2.4 SICK AND TIRED, FED UP, IRRITATED 
Both sick and t ired and · fed up a r e co mpound s d e r ive d 
from terms for b o dil y states , which have now a c qu i red 
dis t i n c t , idiomatic meanings. In each case an emphat i c form 
has c ome to represent the emotional rather than the ph y si c al 
s tate . Sick and tired has achieved its emphasis through the 
c ombining of two separate unpleasant body states: f e d up 
has achieved its emphasis by adding a perfective marker , 
s ign a lling something like "I can't take any more" . 
2.4 . 1 SICK AND TIRED 
Examples: a) ACDP is sick and tired of such unwarranted 
a ttack s on its institutions. 
(C.T. 21/3/89) 
b) We 're all sick and tired of this rain . 
c) I will do everything 1n my power t o 
p o sitively set the position straight. I ' m sick and tired of 
s itting back and being used, and it won ' t happen any longer. 
(-Laurie Connell: C.T. 28/8/89) 
d) After ten days they were all sick and tired 
of living out of suitcases. 
e) As an opposition member of Parliament I got 
sick and tired of ministers telling me they couldn't afford 
to spend more money on roads, teachers and police. 
(Qld. Justice Minister: C.T. 6/1/90 : 4) 
f) He accused her of taking he I' pl ea sure with 
Clara while he was away, and of besmirching the names of the 
c hi 1 dI'en, the honor of the house, and the memory of their 
dear depaI'ted mother, and told her he was sick and tired of 
her evi 1 tricks and that he was throwing her out of the 
house. 
(Allende:157-8) 
g} I ' m sick and tired of the whole show . 
(Cambridge:205) 
57 
Meaning: X thinks this: 
1. Something (Z) has been happening for a 
long time. 
2. I don't want it to happen any more . 
3. I don't know if I can cause it not to 
happen any more. 
X feels something bad because of that. 
Discussion: 1 . Something (Z) has been happening for a long 
time. Whatever happened . may be a series of events 
( u nw a rrant e d attacks) or a continuous happening (the rain) , 
but i t must have some duration. 
•I am s ick and tired of that bomb blast . 
I t i s not necessary that the event be happening at thi s 
mo me nt, al though with c ontinuous even ts such as rain, that 
would be most likely. 
Note that the action need not be directed at X 
Something is happening to me - although it can be. Nor n e ed 
somebody be seen as responsible for the action - Y is doing 
something (to me) - although again, they can be. In example 
b) , the rain is neither directed at X, nor caused b y 
s omebody (Y). In example c), the action is both directed at 
X and caused by Y. 
2. I don't want it to happen any more. Component 2 
relates X to the action . 
that X judges negatively 
It also specifies just what it i s 
not the inherent nature of the 
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action, but its continued existence. No doubt 
the 
unwarranted attacks of exampl-e a) were judged bad from the 
beginning, but it is quite possible that X enjoyed the rain 
of exa mple b) at first, and only became sick and tired of it 
after the second day. 
The nature of the event and its duration must lead the 
experiencer to believe that it is likely to continue or to 
keep reoccurring. I can be sick and tired of mowing the 
front lawn for as long as I live in this house, but I cannot 
be sic k and tired of building the carport once I have 
finished the job. 
more. 
3. I don't know if I can cause it not to happen any 
The degree of control that X can have over the 
situation varies from zero· for the rain in example b) to a 
considerable amount for the man throwing his wife out of the 
house in example f) All that can be said is that X does 
not have full control. Sick and tired does not carry 
overtones of potential action, but neither does it rule out 
the possibility. Speakers are more likely to use fed up 
when some action is precipitated, because it implies that a 
particular kind of feeling is being experienced at the 
body's limit, and reserve sick and tired for occasions when 
one is resigned to the situation. 
in my exploration of fed up . 
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This is discussed further 
1, 
• 
It 1s noteworthy that, of all the emotion terms, sick 
and tired 1s the only one where mention of its focus 1.s 
obligatory, and has a set form it must be followed by a 
prepositional phrase introduced by of. There are a number 
of emotion words that may be followed by of ashamed, 
Jeal.ous, afraid, nervous, terrified. All of these may stand 
alone, 
He was nervous. 
I was terrified! 
or may be followed by a variety of forms e.g. a that 
clause, or about: 
He was nervous about asking for a day off. 
I was ashamed that I still hadn't got my licence. 
For sick and tired, however, an of phrase 1.s the only form 
permitted. 
I'm sick and tired of your antics. 
* I'm sick and tired. 
• I'm sick and tired that he is always late. 
* I'm sick and tired because you're always late. 
• I'm sick and tired about your constant lateness . 
I argue in my chapter on the meaning of prepositions 
that follow terms of emotion, that in the frame X is em-ed 
of Y, of means 
When X thinks of Y 
X feels something 
because of things that can happen to X. 
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Expressions like I'm ashamed, I'm afraid , I'm nervous 
already contain the idea of something potentially affecting 
X. They can be used with or without a following of. But 
I ' m sic k and I'm tired relate only to one's present physical 
state. By themselves, they say nothing about the future. 
If we want to indicate that we are projecting our present 
feelings towards the future, as we do when we refer to this 
particular emotion state, we are obliged to use an of 
phrase. 
2.4.2 FED UP 
Examples: a) The Federal Government 1s fed up with the 
heai·y vehicle carnage. 
(Channel 10 News:26/10/89) 
b) After his arrest, F- told detectives he was 
was always thinking of f'ed up with his daughter-in-law and 
killing her. 
(C.T. 19/10/89:10) 
c) The women of Oberammergau, who have 
traditionally been allowed only a supporting role in the 
spectacle (of the passion play) are fed up. They have been 
battling their male counterparts in Bavarian courts for more 
rights in the play. 
(C.T. 5/11/89:26) 
d) That attitude, that people are fed up with 
hearing about it [child abuse stories], ensures that child 
abuse continues to happen. 
(AWW:Oct.88:26) 
e) I am fed up with your self-righteous attitude . 
(Neighbours:Channel 7:20/11/89) 
f) He (Wayne Gardner) 1s a bit fed up that he 
cannot race. 
(C.T. 26/5/90:Dl2) 
g} Police say they are fed up with drivers' 
disregard for the law despite 678 people being charged with 
traffic offences. 
(C.T. :23/12/89:1) 
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h) "If you don't die 
foreign plague, I hope you return a 
w i th a 11 your e cc en tr i c i ties, " his 
of a snakebite or some 
man , because I'm fed up 
fa the I' to 1 d h i m when h e 
said goodbye to him on the pier. 
(Allende:312) 
Meaning: X thinks this: 
1. Something ( z ) has been happening for 
a long time. 
2. This l. s bad. 
X feels something bad because of that. 
X thinks: More z may cause me to do something. 
Discussion: I argue 1n my chapter on prepositions that of 
lS projective, concerned 
existence or non-existence 
including the future . 
wanting/not wanting. 
I 
with one's attitude to the 
of something at all times 
describe this 1n terms of 
So a) Police are sick and tired of the carnage on the roads. 
has as part of its meaning: 
1. The carnage has been going on for a long time. 
2. Police don't want it to continue. 
With, in contrast, 1s reactive, concerned with evaluating as 
good or bad something that has already happened. 
b) Police are fed up with the carnage on the roads . 
has as part of its meaning: 
1. The carnage has been go1.ng on for a long time. 
2. This 1.s bad. 
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In other words, emphasis in a) is on the continued existence 
0 f t he carnage i n t o the f u t u i' e , and i n b ) on the n a t u re o f 
the carnage, which includes its continuance. Expressed in 
the s e terms, there is very little effective difference 1n 
meaning between the two emotion words. 
However, fed up does have an additional component. I 
believe that there is a qualitative difference between the 
two adjectives. I can say 
[ am just about fed up with your nonsense. 
but not ~I am just about sick and tired of your nonsense. 
i.e. fed up refers not only to the quality of the feeling 
but also the quantity. [Ip is a perfective marker. As with 
burnt up, torn up, eaten up, woken up, given up and so on, 
it signals that the action 1s complete i.e. that no more 
is possible. Measured 1n terms of the body's capacity for 
that emotion, fed up represents 100% I can be pretty well 
fed up or just about fed up or totally and completely fed 
up. If the situation continues, the implication is that 
something must happen. If I say to my son 
I'm fed up with your room. 
I want the hearer to believe that I have reached my limit. 
Pragmatically, such declarations have the force of a threat 
or a warning. I may do something 1n response. I express 
this as: 
More Z may cause me to do something. 
So the future 1s implicated 1n both emotion terms -
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sick and tired: because of carries this implication; 
fed up: because of the a~pect marker. 
2.4.3 IRRITATED 
Examples: a) 
Es tabl i shmen t. 
Her religious beliefs irritated the 
(Rumpole on St. Edithna:ABC TV:5/3/89) 
b) Instead, there are clear s1.gns that he 1.s 
increasingly irritated by the worries of Hong Kong leaders 
and Britain's quite proper resolve to listen to them. 
(S.E.U. wl2.8:135: Press Editorial) 
c) Over the next few weeks she was ... not quite 
so happ:v or at ease. She was irritated by my most general 
queries as to where Colin had gone. 
(Forster:195) 
d) A small group of 
irritated by the Follett Government 
fall [rom power. 
influential businessmen 
were instrumental in her 
(C.T. 20/12/89:1) 
e) Mr A. , whose professional hoaxes have 1 ong 
irritated New York editors, showed no remorse. 
(C.T. 10/1/90:14) 
Meaning: X thinks this: 
1. Something has happened many times. 
2. I don't want it to happen any more. 
X feels something bad when it happens. 
Discussion: There are a number of emotion words 
irritated, fed up, hurt - which are metaphors borrowed from 
bodily states and applied to a complex cognitive response to 
a situation. To irritate 1.n a biological sense means to 
excite a bodily organ or part to vital action by the 
application of an external stimulus.(OED) 
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My youngest son's skin was irritated by practically all 
materials except pure cotton, until he was a year old. 
When in our concept we repiace the bodily organ with the 
whole person (he in example b), she in example c)) or a body 
of people capable of collective judgment ( the Establishment 
in example a)) irritation becomes an emotion term, used 
metaphorically. 
1. Something has happened many times. I have 
deliberately avoided using the word bad at this stage. The 
cause of irritation is an event which is not necessarily bad 
when it first occurs; it becomes bad through continued or 
repeated action . 
Note also that there is no reference to Y, the person 
responsible. Our focus may be on Y-doing-something (the man 
sit ting next to me who is sniffing) but the person is 
secondary to the deed. 
focus of our emotion 
religious beliefs of 
It 1s what he is doing that is the 
In the examples above, it is the 
St. Edithna, the worries of the 
leaders, my queries, that are the cause of the emotion, not 
the people themse 1 ves. A dripping tap could provoke the 
same response. Because the event is of a kind that can 
exist without an audience, I have not described the action 
as happening to me, al though obviously I must feel myself 
affected by it. 
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2. I don't want it to happen any more. Events t hat 
c ause irritation a t tract our crit i cal atten t i o n , 
negative judgment . because they continue . 
•I wa s irr i tated when the cow died. 
and o ur 
If we de s cribe our s elves as irritated by something that has 
not ac tually happened before - e . g. a friend ' s request for a 
l oan - then it is interpreted broadly as one in a series of 
s imilar events. (People have been making unreasonable 
demands of me all week . ) 
It is interesting that although we may be irritated by 
any continuing attitude or situation, we are very frequently 
irritated by continuing or repeated sounds (a crowing 
rooster . someone blowing a car horn, a dripping tap) . Just 
as s kin may be excited to abnormal condition through 
r e peated stimulation of the touch receptors, so may part of 
the brain be excited to abnormal condition through our 
hearing receptors. This may be seen as a physiological , 
rather than a cognitive response. Armon-Jones suggests that 
an essential property of emotions is that they "greatly or 
totally preoccupy the agent's attention." (1986:49) . The 
stimulus of our irritation exists prior to causing that 
irritation. We may be vaguely aware of it but we are 
normally attending to something else. As it continues, it 
becomes an intrusion; it demands our full attention . It is 
only when it has made this transition from the edge of our 
consciousness to the focus of our attention that it causes 
that particular ill-feeling we label irritation. Our 
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-sensations becom e emotions only i f we make judgments about 
them. 
Note worth y about irritate d 's syntactic behaviour 
1s that in the frame Xis irritated Y , its preferen ce is 
almost always for by, r a ther than at or with. In other 
words , the c ause -ef fe c t relation s hip with Y 1s significant. 
Irritated is functioning as a passive verb, with a relative 
ti me ft·ame . rather than as an adjective . (This is discussed 
further 1n the following section on prepositions.) In 
ex amples like c) and e) , which I repeat: 
c) Over the next few weeks she was not quite so 
happ,v or at ease. She was i rr i ta ted by my most general 
queries as to where Colin had gone. 
e) Mr A., whose professional hoaxes ha ve long 
irritated New York editors, showed no remorse . 
my under st anding lS that each time a particular event 
occurs, my immediate reaction 1s irritation . There 1 s a 
clos e link between cause and effect. However, if I say: 
I'm fed up with your practical jokes. 
or I'm sick and tired of picking up after you. 
my emotion . 1S due l. n part to our expectation that it will 
contimue rather than being simply a reaction produced each 
time the stimulus occurs . Accordingly, I have phrased the 
feeling component of my definition as: 
X feels something bad when it happens. 
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2.5 ANGRY, ANNOYED, CROSS, FURIOUS 
2. SJ. ANGRY 
Examples: a) At f i r s t I thought he was going to kill me. 
He kept yelling at me , swearing at me . 
me , and s o wa s his wife. 
He was very angry at 
(C . T. 24/1/90:37) 
b) The workers voted 
were still angry about Caltex's 
redundan c y package . 
to stay 
refusal 
(C . T . 25/11/89:5) 
out because 
to negotiate 
the y 
on a 
c) Prost said he felt sorry for his ri v al and 
believed the Brazilian had no reason to be angry with him ... 
"He ma y be angry with others, but not with me . " 
(C.T. 2/11/89:26) 
d) Witnesses testified they watched Williams 
angrily confront and shoot Willis in the barber shop. They 
said Williams became extremely angry at Willis after he 
c laimed the barber botched his haircut. 
(C.T. 19/8/89:13) 
e) "I would have beheaded him, I was so angry." 
(Mother of Mr David Lange: C.T. 15/11/89:1) 
f) Perhaps I surprised 
violently angry than disappointed. 
the for c e of my rage and bitterness. 
(Forster:141) 
her by being more 
I surprised myself by 
Meaning: X thinks this: 
1 . y did something bad (to me) . 
2. I don't want this . 
3. I want to do something bad to Y. 
X feels some thin~ bad because of that. 
Discussion: 1 . Y did something bad (to me). Anger always 
requires a focus (Y), representing whoever or whatever we 
perceive as responsible for the bad event. Suppose a group 
of children are throwing things at each other, and I , an 
uninvolved adult nearby, feel myself hit by something . My 
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1 ikely response wi 11 be anger . The y should have been mo r e 
careful , had more re s pe c t for - others. Then I realize that I 
am standing beside a tree and that it 1.s a tw i g that ha s 
kn o cked me . My anger dissipates immediately. No one 1.s at 
fault. 
One might assume from this that Y must be c apable o f 
both action and intent . Must Y be human? We can certainl y 
be angry with the dogs that keep us awake at night . It 1. s 
doubtful whether we can be angry with the tomato plants that 
refuse to bear fruit or the rain that washed out our picnic. 
To the extent that we can get angry with, for instance, the 
c ar that won't start, or the computer that appears to have a 
mind of its own, then to that extent we attribute human 
properties to the inanimate . Logically Y should always be 
animate and capable of intent. In times of strong emotion , 
however, we are not always logical . 
Residents were angry when the town was flooded. 
1.s not an express1.on of anger against the weather or the 
water, but an implication of human error - that the disaster 
•' 
could have been averted or lessened by human action . Anger 
will be directed at a particular person or body the 
planners, the eng1.neers, the emergency serv1.ces for not 
helping sooner, and so on. 
We may at times be angry with ourselves, for our lack 
of foresight or care or skill. Without a focus, our emotion 
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may be frustration, or exasperation, but it will not be 
anger. 
.. bad: Y's action must be perceived as containing 
something bad. A sentence like 
I was angry with John for helping me 
makes se n s e only if I view his help as in some way bad. 
2. I don't want this. Y's action need not be directed 
at X. Y may not know that X exists: 
I was angry at the government for breaking its promise 
yet again. 
but X must care about Y's action. X must feel as if Y did 
it to him. I can be angry because I think a teacher has 
treated my child unfairly. 
myself. 
My child is an extension of 
3. I want to do something bad to Y. This component 
represents probably the most crucial difference between 
angry and the other anger-type terms like annoyed and 
irritated. The same person, faced with the same situation. 
may at one time feel angry and at another time, annoyed. 
However, I argue that the more serious the event , the more 
likely it is to provoke anger. 
a) ?I was annoyed when my son was assaulted by 
police. 
b) ?I was annoyed when I discovered a group of 
children abusing an old woman. 
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c) ?I was annoyed when the Bank collapsed with all my 
sav1.ngs. 
and 1n contrast : 
d) ?I was angry when I forgot my dental appointment. 
' 
e) ? I was angry when the phone rang whi 1 e I was in 
the shower. 
Averill writes that 
provocations to anger are liable to involve 
violations of deeply held convictions and values, or 
else pose a threat to one's sense of self. (p.246) 
I would go further. I believe anger always results from a 
perceived threat to one's deeply held convictions or to 
one's self-esteem. We may get angry over apparent trivia -
a dirty coffee cup, or a towel left lying on the floor - but 
our anger will be because we have interpreted these actions 
as a threat to our own standards and values. Solomon 
agrees: 
Anger al ways involves a judgment that one's self has 
been offended or violated. (1977:188). 
So if I leave my umbrella on the bus, I will probably feel 
annoyed rather than angry. I am unlikely to take the event 
as a threat. If my husband leaves a dirty coffee cup in the 
bedroom, I may be merely annoyed, but if I interpret his 
action as a lack of consideration for my values, I will feel 
angry. 
Because the triggering situation of anger involves a 
perceived threat to a part of ourselves that we value 
greatly, and because we can focus on somebody or something 
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to blame, our instinctive response is aggressive. Anger is 
much more likely than annoyance to involve expressive 
reactions like physical attack, verbal abuse, symbolic 
gestures. We may successfully repress any outward show, but 
if we are angry we will want to hurt the person who hurt us . 
I have considered whether I need to specify the degree 
of badness as a way of differentiating between angry on the 
one hand and emotion t e t·ms 1 i ke annoyed and furious on the 
other. Averill has written: 
As 
One of the most frequently mentioned and intuitively 
obvious differences between anger and annoyance is 
that, on the average, anger is the more intense 
emotion. Indeed, some theorists have not bothered to 
distinguish anger from annoyance, assuming that the 
difference is only one of intensity (cf. Plutchik., 
1980) . 
Averill points out, it depends what you mean by 
intensity. 
The intensity of an emotion can be manifested in a 
vari .ety of different ways; for example, the degree of 
physiological arousal, the vehemence of overt behavior , 
the duration of the exper·ience, the extent to which a 
person thinks about .. the incident, and so forth. 
(p.243). 
In my definitions, I have tried to avoid any description of 
the resultant feeling state beyond evaluating it as good or 
bad. Only the subject can know such things. The intensity 
of anger must be captured in the judgments made by the 
subject rather than merely being identified in the resultant 
feeling state. Averill has found that 
people are generally quite able to distinguish between 
their experiences of anger and annoyance Of the 
1 5 3 8 e pi sod es recorded by subj e c ts in the i r di a 1· i es , 
96% were classified as either anger or annoyance. In 
only 4% of the episodes did subjects indicate that they 
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were "uncertain" about how to classify a response. 
(p.249). 
The difference in intensity between the two is a reflection 
of something further. In each case, different things are 
taken into account. We can recognize anger because we want 
to do something bad to the person we blame. And that, in 
turn, results from the perception that whatever that person 
did is a threat to ourselves. Annoyance has no such desire, 
no such perception of threat. 
2.52 ANNOYED 
Examples: a) Was rather annoyed 1.n Sunday School because 
my class was noisy and Wilfred had to speak to them. 
(S.E.U. wB.2:196: Journals) 
b) Miss Syer tackled me about notice of Whist 
Drive for Father Neath, & I was annoyed I'd slipped up, so 
took one up to him after coffee. 
(S.E.u. · wB.2:400: Journals) 
c) Andy was Just annoyed with himself for being 
so careless. 
( Ha 11: 16 5) 
d) We' re annoyed with the dee is ion. We were 
only notified 20 minutes before the press conference. 
(C.T. 29/6/90:4) 
e) The 
reason than that I 
confused me. 
bombardment of interest for no other 
was my father's son both annoyed and 
(Hillary:149) 
Meaning: X thinks this: 
1. Someone did something bad (to me). 
2. This shouldn't have happened. 
X feels something bad because of that. 
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Discussion: I believe that when we are annoyed, as when we 
are angry, it is not just because something bad happens, but 
because it is seen as unnecessary or avoidable. That is, we 
attribute it to human error. 
a) ~I was annoyed when hail destroyed the vegetable 
gal'den. 
b) I was annoyed when my washing got wet. 
Annoyed 1 s more acceptable in sentence b) than a), because 
in b) the event could possibly have been avoided if someone 
had noticed the weather in time. 
However, the identity of the person responsible is not 
particularly important. 
I was annoyed when the bus was late. 
Our focus is on the bad happening rather than on whoever is 
responsible. So I have described the agent as someone, but 
have not given him an identity, Y. This contrasts with 
anger, when we look for someone or something (Y) to blame 
for the bad happening. In example e) above, Hillary's 
emotion 1s directed not at the people who are flocking 
around him so much as at what they are doing. It is the 
action that 1s central to his focus rather than the person 
behind it. There is no sense of wanting to hurt the person 
responsible. 
As I have · argued 1n my discussion of angry, anger 
involves threats to one's own values or self-esteem, and for 
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th i s reason can .be over w he 1 ming ( a 1 though th i s 1 s not an 
essential feature). Annoyance is never overwhelming. 
*I was violently annoyed. 
~I was overwhelmed by annoyance. 
It is a response to a situation judged as not particularly 
impoctant. It may disturb my short-term comfort or 
convenience, but it 1s not a threat. So I am probably 
annoyed cather than angry if my bus 1s late, or I forget my 
dental appointment. Annoyances tend to be quickly 
forgotten: anger can be harboured for years. 
2.5.3 CROSS 
Examples: a) Neither Nabokov nor I ever said a cross word 
to one another. 
(Field:9) 
b) I was really quite cross with George - the way 
he went on at the party last night. 
box. 
c) The brooch Daddy bought me was in my treasure 
It'll be all burnt up too. Will Daddy be cross? 
(Rowe:245) 
d) He 
employer) that he 
would have to pretend to Memsahib (his 
had not known Mr Bhoolabhoy was back, if 
she was cross with him in the morning. 
(Scott:53) 
e) She thought of go1.ng home. 
cross with Tusker (her husband) But it 
thing to remind him that she was not 
granted. 
(Scott:152) 
She was no longer 
would be no bad 
to be taken for 
f) "I don't think I'd better," said Alison 
Ashley. "I'm not allowed to wear make-up. My mother would 
be cross. " 
(Klein:59) 
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Meaning: X thinks this: 
1 . y did some-thing bad (to me). 
2. I don't want this. 
3. I want to do something bad to 
Y. 
X feels something bad because of that. 
4. y 1S as my child. 
X feels something less bad because of that. 
Discussion: Cross has the same first three components as 
angry. The focus of our emotion is a person who has done 
something we don't want. It is component 4, however, that 
gives cross its specialized meaning. 
Cross carries an assumption of status - i.e. that Y is 
lower in status, and thus responsibility, than X . 
a) :tThe Presidents of the two superpowers were cross 
with each other. 
b) :,The students were cross with the Principal when he 
told them to tidy the classroom. 
Solomon has pointed out (p.284) that anger is a great 
equalizer. When you are angry you judge the antagonist by 
your own standards. To be angry with a superior is to raise 
yourself to his level. To be angry with a child . 1S to treat 
him, perhaps unfairly, as an adult. Cross, on the other 
hand, implies that the antagonist . 1S . in some way less 
responsible for his actions, either because he is a child , 
or through other mitigating circumstances. 
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Child in English, however , has two meanings -
a sub-mature person 
a son/daughter. 
Solomon's view is of a child who has lowered responsibility 
for his action because of his age and limited experience 
i.e. child in its first meaning. Y is as a child. 
Either meaning of child could apply when cross is used 
by X, an adult, towards Y , when Y is a child, or an adult 
with diminished responsibility, or even a pet dog. In cases 
when X and Y are apparently equals, as in examples a), b) 
and e), the suggestion of diminished responsibility (what I 
might feel for a child - any child) seems inappropriate . I 
suggest it is to signal the fact that a special relationship 
exists between X and Y, which is possessive and protective , 
even while criticizing. (What I might feel for my child). 
Looking at example a) ' Andrew Field was Nabokov 's 
biographer, and 1S concerned to emphasize the close 
relationship between himself and the writer. In example b), 
the speaker has chosen cross rather than angry presumably 
because she is his wife/lover/close friend. 
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2.54. FURIOUS 
Examples: a) Sean, who had slept little in the previous 48 
hours and was wear1.ng the same clothes he left Sydney in on 
Monday, was left for six hours "afraid and hungry" in a 
room. His mother said she was furious with the way her 
son had been treated. 
(C.T. :2/2/89) 
b) I think A was so sure he'd be re-elected (the 
first time a Chairman has been chucked out at end of 1st 
year) he was furious. 
(S.E.U. w7.5:191:Letters - social) 
c) He 
after pay1.ng more 
was furious to find himself 1.n a 
than $150 for a ticket. 
back row 
(C . T. 6/8/89) 
d) Speaking to reporters, Mr Lange 's 80 year old 
mother denounced her son's actions. "I was furious. I 
didn't swear, but I told him 1n no uncertain terms what I 
thought of him. " 
(C.T. 14/11/89:5) 
e ) Th e Ra i de rs are s t i 11 f u 1· i o us ab o u t sever a 1 
decisions made by Ward during the game. 
(C.T. 4/7/90:38) 
f) The Treasu1·er is said to be furious about the 
publication of a Prime Ministerial memo telling him to tone 
down planned remarks about Telecommunications-industry 
ref'orms. 
Meaning: 
(C.T. 2/8/90:1) 
X thinks this: 
1. Someone did something very bad to me. 
2. This shouldn't have happened to me. 
3. I want to do something to cause other 
people to know this. 
X feels something bad because of that. 
Discussion: In Greek mythology the Furies were avenging 
spirits. A furious person 1s regarded as possessed by 
spirits, no longer 1n control of himself, so no longer bound 
by personal or social standards of conduct. 
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1. Someone did something very bad (to me). 
2. This shouldn't have happened to me. The action 
need not have been directed at X, but he must feel · as if he 
has been personally wronged . 
~I was furious when Iraq invaded Iran. 
LS inappropriate if I do not identify in any real way with 
the latter. 
As with angry, whatever has happened is seen as a belittling 
of one's own values. 
~I was furious when I lost a button off my shirt. 
is inappropriate because the event is unlikely to be seen as 
a threat . 
X must also believe that someone is to blame. 
a) ~I was furious that the tidal wave destroyed 
people's homes. 
b) I was furious that police destroyed people ' s homes . 
Logically, as we saw with anger, this should mean someone 
capable of both action and intent. "Someone" should be 
either human or temporarily perceived as human. 
What is the difference between furious and angry? Just 
as I argued that the difference between angry and annoyed 
was not simply one of degree, but a reflection that 
different judgments were being made, so does the same appl y 
to furious and angry. Obviously, there are many situations 
where either word is appropriate: 
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I was angry/furious with George for forgetting to pi c k 
up the children . 
But what about 
a) I think A was so sure he ' d be re-ele c ted (the first 
time a Chairman has been chucked out at end of 1st 
year) he was furious. (~angry) 
or b) He was furious (?angry) to find himself 1.n the back 
row after paying $150 for a ticket. 
I s angry inappropriate in these cases because it is not 
emphatic enough? Not necessarily. Annoyed 1s an acceptable 
alternative in the second sentence: 
He was annoyed to find himself 1n the back row after 
pay1.ng $150 for a ticket. 
It may be that angry is less acceptable than either furious 
or annoyed because angry always needs a focus, someone we 
can blame. The ~ore colloquial mad behaves like angry. We 
are typically angry with/at someone, mad at someone. It 1 s 
an inter-personal emotion. In contrast, when we feel 
wronged, but are focussing on the situation rather than the 
person responsible, we are more likely to be furious or 
annoyed, states which can be experienced without relating to 
another person. 
a) I was furious (annoyed) to read about my private 
life in a magazine. 
b) I was ~mad (?angry} to read about my private life 
. . 1n a magaz1.ne. 
Because furious focusses on the situation rather than 
the person responsible, I have expressed the latter in · 
component 1 as "someone", but have not given it a particular 
identity, Y . 
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3. I want to do something to cause other people to 
know this. When we are furious, we may be pushed beyond 
normal standards of behaviour. This assessment 1s more 
likely to be made by others. I do not think that the 
exper1encer 1s consciously evaluating his behaviour at the 
time. What he 1s conscious of 1s a need to demonstrate his 
intensity of feeling. With angry, we want to hurt the 
pet'son responsible ( I want to do something bad to Y); with 
fur i o us we may us e s t r on g w o r d -s and v i o 1 en t a c t i on . bu t they 
will not necessarily be directed towards the person or body 
held responsible. Fury 1s often depicted as "blind" . We 
lash out blindly, not necessarily to hurt the p e rso n 
responsible, but as an expression of our viol 0r:t feelings , 
and to draw the attention of others to our dep th of feeling. 
I have expressed this intensity of f e eling as I want to do 
something to cause other people to know this. 
Metaphorically, it can be applied to non-human 
elements: 
The long tail. of a grey courser at furious speed 
(S.E .U . wll.3 - 81:General non-fiction) 
It snew furiously on Friday again. 
(S.E.U. w7.1 - 373: Letters - social). 
The implication 1s that the happening 1s beyond the normal 
laws of nature . 
2. 55. Aspects of syntactic behaviour of angry, annoyed, 
cross and furious: 
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At first sight these four words all behave in similar ways , 
all typically followed by with + person Y . Yet an 
examination of the kind of contexts in which they appear can 
s how that they favour different perspectives , focussing on 
either the human object, the situation, or the feeling state 
it s elf . Angry and cross, I suggest, are always inter-
personal. When I am angry because my daughter has scratched 
my car, in effect I am angry with my daughter . If I am 
cross, I have modified my emotion because of the status of 
the person who is the object of my emotion. In each case my 
emotion requires an identified human (or temporarily 
regarded as human) object. 
Annoyed and furious may also be interpersonal, but 
identifying the other person is not an essential part of our 
emotion. The situation can be sufficient focus . 
I was annoyed that the bus was late. 
I was furious that the school was to be closed. 
Although presumably there will be someone who is responsible 
for the situation, that persons identify is not so 
important to us. There is not the same interaction between 
two people as with angry and cross. 
We can a 1 so be angry or f u 1· i o us ( or mad) at someone . 
As I argue in chapter 3, the choice between with and at is a 
choice between 
a) (with): stressing that I continue to think about 
something and feel this emotion; or 
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b) (at): stressing what I feel at the moment of 
discovering s omething. 
If we are concerned to emphasize the strength of our feeling 
s t a t e, we will be more likely to use at than with, even when 
our emotion 1s directed towards another person. For this 
reason we find angry at George, mad at George, furious at 
George, while the milder emotions, annoyed and cross , seldom 
if ever take at+ person Y -
?I was annoyed at my husband. 
?I was cross at the children. 
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2.6 OUTRAGED, INDIGNANT, OFFENDED. 
2.6.1 OUTRAGED 
Examples: a) She was outraged to discover that Oscar had 
never known the taste of Christmas pudding . 
(Carey:9) 
b) Physicists were outraged that a pair of 
c hemists should trespass on their territory, and the entire 
medi c al profession was outraged that anybody could offer 
evidence that might substantiate the claims of homeopathy . 
(C.T. :7/8/89) 
c) The What Price Heritage paper outraged the art 
world earlier this year when it questioned continued Federal 
s upport for institutions such as the Australian National 
Gallery. 
(C.T. :30/8/89:10) 
d) When the 
violence) emanate from 
the community appalled. 
allegations (of physical and sexual 
a classroom, parents are outraged, 
(C . T. 14/10/89:9) 
e) The ACT Government has been at tacked by 
outraged parents, students, and its own staff for its 
"insensitive and illogical" handling of school closures. 
(C.T. 25/11/89:15) 
Meaning: X thinks this: 
1. Someone did something very bad. 
2. No one should have done this. 
3. I didn't think anyone would do this. 
4. Other people would think the same as me . 
5. I want to do something because of this. 
X feels something bad because of that. 
Discussion: 1 . Y (other than X) did something very bad. 
Like indignant and offended, the term requires an agent who 
mu s t be other than X -
~I was outraged that I had joined the Communist Party. 
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Outrage 1s a strong emotion. Its very morphemes express 
a strong expressive reaction rage, out. It cannot aply 
to something trivial: 
*I was outraged that no one remembered the sugar. 
It s hares this aspect of meaning with furious. There are 
man y co nte xts where both furious and outraged could be used 
equally well : 
He was furious/outraged when his wife left , taking the 
hi - fi . 
Where the two words differ 1s that outraged refers to a 
perceived abuse of public standards while furious involves a 
perceived threat to one's personal values. The first 
co mponent differs from that of furious in omitting . . to me. 
a) r was outraged that mustard gas was used on the 
Kurds by their own coun tr,ymen. 
b) :t I was furious that mustard gas was used on the 
Kurds by their own countrymen. 
I can be furious only if my personal values, or those of 
someone with whom I closely identify, are belittled. In 
contrast, outrage 1S a reaction to the belittling of 
societal values. Whatever Y did 1s seen as an offence 
against society. (This 1s defined in components 2 - 4.) It 
may also be a personal offence against X, but this 1S 
subsumed 1n the wider definition . In example a) above , 
Oscar's father has committed the offence against Oscar. The 
housekeeper, who is simply an observer , 1s the one who feels 
outraged . The victim and the person 
. . 
exper1enc1ng the 
emotion need not coincide. 
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2. No one should have done this. There are contexts 
i n w hi ch o u tr aged 1 o o ks , a t ·f i r s t s i g h t , 1 i k e an em p ha t i c 
indignant: 
I was outraged/in dignant that my daughter was accused 
of cheati ng . 
but there other contexts where indignant is clearly 
inappropriate: 
The British Government was outraged (~indignant) at the 
murder of its Cabinet Minister. 
An offence c an be recognized as bad simply because the 
participants are particular people for whom these actions 
are inappropriate (Y shouldn't have done this to Z) . With 
o utraged, Y's crime is so defined that it is recognized as a 
c rime regardless of who did it. 
3. I didn't think anyone would do this. Y's crime 1s 
further defined. Where component 2 refers to the 
o b]igations of the group members, component 3 deals with X's 
expectations of behaviour of the group members . The nature 
of the action comes as a shock to X. Not only is it beyond 
what X might expect from Y: it is beyond what he would 
expect from anyone. 
4. Other people would think the same as me. Our 
social groupings are defined by shared social values. I am 
judging Y's action not merely in terms of what suits me, but 
in terms of what our society accepts. 
5. I want to do something because of this. Outraged, 
like angry and furious, is a motivating emotion. With 
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angry, we are angry with someone; we switch our focus from 
the action to the person responsible. With outraged, our 
focus 1s not on the agent, but on the fact that something 
was done that was contrary to group values. If no 
particular person can be identified (and this could happen, 
for instance, when any particularly horrific crime lS 
committed), we still feel outraged that such a thing could 
happen in our society. We have no identified person against 
whom we can direct our feelings, but we will want to do 
something as a result. 
Both outraged and furious express extreme emotion. The 
latter implies blind, unreasoned passion. The former 1s 
preferable if one wishes to carry a message of the strongest 
displeasure against what sees as a threat to community 
values, arrived at after careful consideration. Letters to 
the Editor frequently begin: 
I wish to express my outrage 
2.6.2 INDIGNANT 
Examples: a) Everyone was indignant when it seemed we were 
being accused of sloth and ineptitude. 
b) "I'm [not] romantic," cried Viola indignantly, 
smarting under this insult. 
(S.E.U. wl6.2 - 205: Prose fiction) 
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c) 
fieldwork 1.n 
these claims 
respond in the 
She ... insisted that she ... conducted all her 
the Samoan 1 anguage . When the veracity of 
was occasionally challenged, she did not 
Samoan languag~; she became indignant. 
(C.T. 27/11/89:9) 
d) "Not mean anything.'" shouted the 
father. "He can kiss a girl - a daughter of m1.ne 
mean an ything-" 
(Cambridge:74) 
indignant 
- and not 
e) I was indignant that the accused had been 
treated more kindly than the victim. 
Meaning: X thinks this: 
1 . y (other than X) did something to someone 
( z) . 
2. Because of this I know: y believes that 
z l.S something ( Q) . 
3. z l.S not Q. 
4. y shouldn't have done this to z. 
X feels something bad because of that. 
Discussion: 1 . Y did something to someone (Z). Y must be 
other than X. 
• I was indignant with myself for forgetting his name. 
It 1s possible to be angry, annoyed, cross. even furious 
with oneself, but it 1s impossible to be either offended, 
outraged or indignant as a result of one's own actions. 
(See component 3 below) 
Although X can never coincide with Y, it frequently happens 
that X and Z coincide ( I am indignant because someone has 
done something to me) . However, it 1s not essential that X 
88 
• 
be the recipient of the action. I can be indignant at the 
treatment of refugees in the Middle East . 
Someone (Y) must be seen as responsible. 
a) #[ was indignant when the high wind blew off 
the carport roof. 
b) ~Jim was indignant when his foot began to 
ache. 
And someone (Z) must be seen as a "victim", in the sense of 
being unjustly, rather than badly , treated. 
We were i n di gn an t to be o ff ere d a $ 1 0 0 0 gr an t . 
makes sense only if we see the grant as an insult for 
example, if we believed that a larger amount was 
appropriate. 
The triggering action can be an act of . . omission. 
I was indignant because the committee ignored me. 
2. Because of this I know: Y believes that Z is 
something (Q). X assumes that Y's action reflects some 
judgment about Z (e.g. that Z is young or dishonest or in 
need of discipline or simply not worth considering). 
Whether this judgment is good or bad for Z is irrelevant. 
( See example b), above, where Viola 1s indignant at beng 
called romantic.) I can be indignant if Z gets treated like 
a king or an animal, provided only that I consider the 
treatment unjust. 
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3. Z is not Q. X denies the correctness of Y ' s 
judgment . If my son is called a liar, I will be indignant , 
because I know he is not a liar . A word commonly associated 
with indignation is righteous. X's judgment is right so Y's 
must be wrong. It is this fact - that Y's judgment of Z is 
incompatible with X's judgment of z that makes it 
impossible to be indignant with oneself. 
4. Y shouldn't have done this to Z. Y's action was 
based on a false premise: therefore it was unjustified. X 
believes that Z did not deserve such treatment. 
It is not necessary for Z to be aware of being unfairly 
treated. One could, for instance, be indignant at the 
treatment of babies. 
2.6.3 OFFENDED 
Examples: a) In fact, given their unusual length, some 
readers might feel of fended by the fact that the 
explications proposed here are called "definitions" at all . 
1987:26) 
b) We did, 
few R. N. A. unofficial 
is always somebody who 
(Wierzbicka: 
with difficulty, manage to get a 
meetings but very difficult as there 
is offended with somebody else. 
(S.E.U. :w7.5 - 192: Letters) 
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c) What offends me, and should offend us all , 
about Kickboxer is the insult that it offers to the 
intelligence of the public . 
(C.T. - 21/10/89:B4 - Film Review) 
Meaning: X thinks this: 
1 . y (other than X) did something. 
2. Before this I thought: y wouldn't want to 
do this when people will know. 
3. Now I think: y would want to do this 
when people will know. 
4. Now I know that y thinks something bad 
about what other people think. 
5. I don't want this. 
X feels something bad because of that. 
Discussion: Hurt and offended are triggered by similar 
c ir c umstances X judges Y's behaviour as inappropriate. 
Whereas hurt requires a prior emotional bond between X and 
Y, offended needs nothing more than assumed shared social 
values. Between all individuals, even individuals who do 
not know one another, there are certain expectations of 
behaviour. Although community standards apply, one person's 
sense of what is appropriate may not coincide exactly with 
another's. Such mismatches are the circumstances of 
offended. 
1. Y ( other than X) did some thing. As with hu1·t, 
another person is always seen as responsible. There is a 
clash of values, so Y must be other than X. 
*I was offended by my own stupidity. 
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The emotion depends on the · attribution of judgment to 
someone; it cannot be the result of some act of nature -
* I was offended when the floodwaters washed away the 
tennis court. 
The emotion results from judging a prior action. 
*I am offended that he won't have gone by tomorrow. 
The action may be an act of People are . . omission . 
frequently offended because something has not been done 
to/for them that they consider should have been done. 
I was offended at not being asked to Jane's party. 
2. Before this I thought: Y wouldn't want to do this 
when people wi 11 know. X and Y do not need to know one 
another personally. It is sufficient that they share the 
same social conventions, in particular the knowledge that 
their public actions are regulated by what people will 
think. X must consider Y's action one that Y should know to 
be socially inappropriate. 
3. Now I think: Y would want to do this when people 
will know. X assumes that Y does not care what other people 
think. Note that this need not be the case. We often 
unwittingly cause offence. (I'm terribly sorry I offended 
your mother. It never occurred to me that she wasn 't 
speaking to your father. ) What is important 1.s not Y's 
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intention, but X's interpretation of it. Depending upon 
whether X feels a slight ha~ been directed against him 
personally, or against him simply as a member of the public, 
X can take Y's action as dismissive either of personal or 
community standards. 
4. Now I know that Y thinks something bad about what 
other people think. X reads into Y's action an evaluative 
judgment of other people's values (including the possibility 
that they are not worth considering) Y's bad feelings, X 
thinks, are directed at what other people believe rather 
than at other people personally. Consider the following -
Many people were offended by the portrayal of Christ as 
a man with mortal passions. 
Those who are offended by the film on the life of Christ 
feel that the film-maker has belittled their beliefs. In 
the same way one can be offended by the language of a play 
or the images in a painting. They are felt to threaten the 
values underpinning one's society. 
The accuracy of Y's judgment 1s not at issue, only its 
appropriateness. It lS in this respect that offended 
differs from indignant. Suppose someone calls me a rotten 
cook. I may privately agree with their judgment, but I 
don't want to be thought a rotten cook and I certainly do 
not want to be told that I am. Even if Y thinks I am a 
rotten cook, he should have had more consideration for me 
than to say so. I have been treated as less than I deserve 
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(regardless of my c o o k i ng abilit y ) . The point at iss u e is 
not whether or not I am a rotten cook , but whether or not Y 
should feel free to say bad things about me . I c an als o b e 
i nd ignant if I am called a rotten cook , but my emotion will 
be be c ause . I genuinel y believe I am a good c ook. 
5. I don't want this. Y's action does not have to be 
directed deliberately at X, but X must care about the 
s ituation . If X sees two women brawling in the street, he 
will feel offended only if he feels himself degraded by 
their action. If he sees their action as a slight to the 
public rather than to himself, he is more likely to describe 
the action as offensive rather than himself as offended. I 
c an be of fended only to the extent that I feel myself 
involved . 
Whether an individual interprets an event as offensive 
would seem, from the choices offered by syntax , to be a 
matter of volition. 
experiencer 
experiencer 
1S 
. 
lS 
agent 
patient. 
One can take offence where the 
or be offended where the 
At first glance it may seem odd 
that taking offence is regarded as volitional. 
it if I take offence at your manner? 
Can I help 
Taking offence, and taking umbrage, share the same 
syntactic frame as taking fright. Both can be followed by 
an optional at phrase. I concluded in my discussion of 
proud that the take+ emotion construction means that 
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1. X felt something. 
2. X did something because · of that. 
When we take fright , we take deliberate a c tion to avoid the 
bad anticipated outcome. The following example suggests 
s omething similar for taking offence : 
A less understanding buyer might well have taken 
o ffence and abandoned the whole matter. 
( ( Ishiguro: 10) 
When we take of fence, it would seem that we carry out some 
purposive action , not simply to express our emotion, but to 
c hange the situation, or to remove ourselves from it. 
Words like angry, annoyed, cross and furious are a 
reflection of one's personal values. Outraged, indignant 
and offended result from our judgment of a more complex 
s ituation which includes social values , and, for indignant , 
matters of fact. Bedford has pointed out (1986:27) that the 
purpose of statements about emotions is often not to report 
feelings or to explain behaviour, but to convey judgments. 
This is particularly true for words like offended, indignant 
and outraged. Just as angry and cross are essentially 
interpersonal, so offended, indignant and outraged are 
essentially communicating to others one's judgment of an 
action or situation. We are usually indignant/ 
offended/outraged that event z happened, or offended/ 
outraged at/by situation Z. We are not indignant/ offended/ 
outraged with George, but indignant at George's · remal'ks , 
offended by his behaviour, outraged that he was prepared to 
say that about us. 
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3. THE ROLE OF PREPOSITIONS FOLLOWING EMOTION TERMS 
3.1 Introduction: 
Various people have written on what has come to be 
referred to as the "aboutness" of emotions. Their interest 
lies in the appraised object of the emotion. 
Harr~ has written: 
All emotions are intentional - that 1.s, they are 
' about ' something , in a very general sense. We are 
afraid of. mad at ... , Jealous of ... , chagrined 
because ... , sad about ... , grieved for ... , proud of .. 
and so on . In some cases some cognitive work has to be 
done to seek out the cause of a bodily perturbation. 
[However], some belief 1.n the existence of a 
suitable intentional object is a necessary condition 
for their correct use (i.e. of emotion words). 
(1986:8) 
Averill agrees: 
It must. . . be admitted that the appraised object 1. s 
probably the most consistent and surest guide to the 
identification of an emotional episode. Each kind of 
emotion has its own characteristic objects, reflecting 
a particular set of appraisals. 
(1982:11) 
Wittgenstein considers the same facts in slightly 
different terms. He writes that -
. 
'. 
Among emotions the directed might be distinguished 
form the undirected . Fear at something, JOY over 
something. 
This something 1.s the object, not the cause of the 
emotion . 
. . . ~Anxiety' 1.s what undirected fear might be called. 
(1967:87) 
Sidestepping the issue of just what each writer means 
by intentional or directed, I argue that all emotions are 
related to something in the outside world. Emotions are 
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the result of cognitions about something. Wittgenstein's 
"undirected" anxiety relates - to something happening in the 
future just as fear does. The only difference is that in 
the case of anxiety, less is known of the nature of the 
possible happening. Other emotions in which a focus may not 
be apparent include lonely, sad and depressed. 
focus, albeit a negative one -
I am lonely without you. 
Lonely has a 
Sad also focusses on absence. Sadness is caused by thoughts 
of the loss in one's future of something one values. 
Depressed as an emotion term 1.s more problematic. 
have a readily identifiable focus -
I was depressed at the stock market crash . 
It can 
but the emotion it represents can also be one of the 
defining features of a more prolonged state -
I was really depressed all last week. 
In this case I suggest the focus of the emotion is anything 
or everything. One's perception has been altered so that 
whatever one is thinking about, past or future, is seen as 
bad. In this sense it is more comparable with shy, or bad-
tempered, or cranky i.e. a disposition in some people 
towards a certain emotion. 
My interest lies in the preposition rather than in the 
appraised object. The preposition defines the relationship 
between the experiencer and the appraised object. Rather 
than describing emotions as directed at (Wittgenstein), or 
intentional (Harr~), I describe them as related to something 
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in the outside world because I want to include causes (I was 
annoyed by Y) as well as obj~cts (I was annoyed at Y) in the 
following analysis. By stands in a slightly different class 
from the other prepositions because it can follow past 
participles that are not emotion terms, and it emphasizes 
the verbal rather than the adjectival nature of the past 
participle. 
I can see how something seen as a cause (by Y) differs 
in its relationship from something seen as an object or 
focus (with/at/about/of Y), but the distinctions between the 
prepositions in the latter group are more subtle, and 
deserve closer attention. 
A striking property of emotion words in context is the 
range of prepositions that · follow them -
There 
e.g. delighted with 
ashamed of 
worried about 
irritated by 
sorry for 
mad at 
grateful to 
upset over. 
are syntactic restrictions . upon the kind of 
relationship possible with any given emotion word. For 
instance, I can be 
angry with George 
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angry at the thought of what he did 
angry about the way he was treated 
but I cannot be angry :tby/:tof/:tfor George . I can be Jealous 
of George, but not Jealous :twith/:tat/:tb:y/:tfor George, and so 
on. Each emotion term has its own list of permissibl ,? 
relationships. These depend on both the meaning of + Le 
preposition and the meaning of the emotion ter m. They may 
also vary according to the nature of the n cu n phrase which 
follows the preposition. It is pr imarily meaning that 
determines their syntactic beha viour. 
I intend to look at -:? ach preposition in turn - within 
the frame X 1s em-ed y to establish what aspect ·of 
its meaning p~ r ~its its use with a range of emotion terms, 
anrl ~~en try to identify what there is about the meanings of 
th e ~on-acc~ptable emotion terms that blocks its use. 
3.2 BY 
I intend to examine first the nature of the emotion 
word that will accept a following by, then the nature of the 
NP which follows by in the frame Xis em-ed by Y . 
1. The nature of the emotion word: 
Dozens, possibly hundreds of emotion words annoyed, 
delighted, pleased, irritated, worried, depressed, saddened, 
and all other emotion terms which are past participles - can 
be followed by by. Adjectives are not acceptable. 
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I was angered (~angry} by George's behaviour. 
I define a past participle as- that form of the verb which 1.s 
used 1.n perfect (X has verb-ed) and passive (X 1.s verb-ed 
[by Y]) constr uctions. So the emotion terms which occur 1.n 
a passive construction are all, by definition , past 
participles. 
There are a handful of emotion words whih look like 
past participles but which do not take by. They include: 
anguished 
wretched 
ashamed 
tired (sick and tired) 
fed up. 
On closer examination these turn out to be not past 
participles but adjectives, or, in the case of anguished , 
also an intransitive verb. They cannot be used in passive 
constructions. 
Looking at each of the above list 1.n turn -
anguished: exists only as an intransitive verb -
~ We anguished over the decision for hours . 
... ,. 
or as an adjective -
He gave an anguished moan. 
It cannot be used transitively -
•It anguished me to read his last letter. 
so cannot be passivized -
~I was anguished by his death . 
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wret c hed: lacks a co rresponding verb. Note that if it were 
a past participle it would be pronounced , according to the 
s ound laws which apply to the grammatical -ed ending, as a 
single syllable ending in final [-t]. ( cf watched) . 
ashamed: The verb shame has a separate past participial 
form - shamed. 
She "'ras shamed by her children's behaviour. 
She was ashamed of her children's behaviour. 
tired: There 1s an active verb tire - This work tires me -
which is occasionally found as a passive - I am tired out by 
all this hard work. But it refers only to the physi ca l 
s tate. When we use tired as an emotion term (as in sick and 
tired), it fo] lows different syntactic rules. 
physical: I am tired out by all this work. (resultant 
state - I have finished working.) 
emotional: I am tired (sick) of al 1 this work . 
(General attitude implying I don't want to work any more .) 
fed up: There are a number of compounds fed up, worked 
up, pissed off, cheesed off, put off , put out, and taken 
aback, which are used as emotion terms. I argue that 
probably all except fed up and worked up are verbs which can 
occur 1n passive constructions: 
a) I was fed up with (~by} his attitude. 
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b) I was worked up over (~by} his decision to close 
the school. 
but c) We were pissed off/cheesed off/put out by having to 
wait a week. 
d) We were put off/taken aback by the smell . 
Although the acceptable group usually o c cur 1n this 
form , they may some t i mes be found 1 n a c t iv e form \\' ~ t h the 
object included before the particle: 
a) It's not having all the facts that's pissing me 
off. (Courtenay:417) 
b) It really puts me off , h e aring him boast about what 
he's been doing a ll week. 
Fed up and worked up J ~ not behave 1n the same way. 
:tTheir alf:itude really fed me up. 
~His de c i ~ ion worked me · up. 
Be 1 .. :::'.. 1 1se they cannot be followed by by, and cannot be used as 
a c +ive verbs 1n their compound form, I conclude that fed up 
and worked up are fully adjectival 1n function. 
Across the language as a whole, the function of past 
participles following the copula can vary from almost 
entirely verbal to almost entirely adjectival. Consider the 
following: 
a) The monkey was teased by a boy with a stick. 
b) I was distressed by your remarks . 
In a) , the past participle 1s predominantly verbal . It 
refers to a particular kind of action rather than a 
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resultant state. This is a normal passive sentence. (A boy 
with a stick teased the monkey .) 
In b) . and in all similar constructions where the past 
parti ci ple is an emotion term , 
I was upset I annoyed/ surprised/ saddened ( b,Y yo ur 
remarks). 
the function of the past participle is ambivalent. Should 
the se ntence be interpreted either as a passive (primarily 
verbal) construction ( Your remarks distressed me) , or as a 
c opula + adjective construction (cf. I was angry)? 
(1990:208-212) uses the sentence 
I was ver,v unimpressed by his excuses . 
Dixon 
t o argue that a past participle preceded by a copula and 
followed by by can be adjectival in function . He uses the 
synt acti c test that only adjectives can be modified by very, 
and notes that unimpressed has no verb form. ( * His excuses 
unimpressed me.) 
I argue that although unimpressed is never used in an 
active construction, it still represents an action. To be 
unimpressed means to be impressed in a negative sense. It 
does not indicate a total lack of action. The fact that the 
word is followed by by is, I believe, sufficient evidence 
that unimpressed is here a past participle. 
It 1 s relatively commonplace to find modified past 
participles in this emotion term+ by construction. I offer 
103 
a) I was prett y di s tress e d b y a l l the c riti c ism. 
b) I was very saddened b y s everal glist e ning bloated 
corpses fl o ating stumpy feet sk y wards in the Tooma 
River. (Hueneke:145) 
Leech and Svartvik offer similar examples : 
c ) I was very irritated by the man in the b l ue suit . 
d) She was very shaken by the news. 
and comment , 
In these "mixed" constructions , we cannot say whether 
the -ed f'orm is a particle or an adjective. 
(1986:195) 
However strong the case for emotion term past participles 
being regarded as functionally adjectives, the fact remains 
that tt " pure (non-past participle) adjectives cannot be 
s ub s tituted before a by phrase: 
I was very saddened (:tsad) by several bloated 
corpses . . 
I was angered (:t angry} by his remarks. 
I was infuriated (:t furious) by her behaviour. 
So some trace of verbal function must still be required 
by any emotion word which is followed by by. Why is this? 
The answer to this question depends on first establishing 
the nature of the following NP. 
2. The nature of Yin the frame Xis em-ed by Y. 
There are constructions in which past participles 
resist being followed by by. 
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Consider the following: 
Your health worries me. 
I am worried about your health . 
#Jam worried by your health. 
HowevP.r, I am worried by the state of your heal th. 
arguably more acceptable. 
Co mpare with 
}'our daughter worr1 es me. 
I am worried by your daughter. 
I am worried about your daughter. 
1S 
When the NP which follows the preposition refers to a 
person, by is normally acceptable because we can infer that 
the person has done something. By can only be used when the 
following NP implies an action or an event. So in the 
se ntence -
I was worried by the wall's collapse. 
Something happened to the wall: it collapsed. 
I was worried by my daughter's behaviour. 
Mention of behaviour implies that she did something. 
I was worried by my daughter's remarks. 
Mention of remarks implies that she said something. 
~I am worried by the wall's height. 
I am worried about the wall's height. 
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The wall's height d o e s not aut o mati c ally involve an a c t io n 
-
or event; it is ju s t a state of being . 
However, I am worried b y my daughter's height . 
i s more acceptable because the height of children changes 
and we c an assume that this stage of my daughter ' s growth is 
s een as an event . 
We can now explain why I am worried by the state of 
j ~our heal th is more acceptable than :t I am worried by your 
health . The focus of the latter 1 s too broad for us to 
know what aspect of your health is under consideration, or 
whether a change is involved. The former, by drawing our 
attention to your (present) state, implies , paradoxically, 
that it must have changed. 
happened. 
Change implies that something 
We are now in a position to answer the question posed 
earlier - why must the emotion term be a past participle? 
I believe the answer lies in the timing of the emotion. 
Past participles have a relative time dimension that 
adjectives lack. If I am angry with George, the adjective 
simply describes my present state. If I am angered by 
George's decision, there are two events mentioned or 
implied, which we can relate to each other in time. George 
made a decision: I was angered. One 1s cause , the other 
effect . Although the timing of the triggering event and the 
experiencing of the emotion may be virtually simultaneous , 
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He was annoyed b y the barking of dogs . 
He was irrita t ed b y the s ound of her v oi c e . 
He was frightened b y a loud bang . 
S he wa s embarrassed by the sight of her s on c limb i ng 
o ut o f the window . 
th e ir a c tual duration is irrelevant; all that i s n ecess ar y 
is that the triggering event and the · emotion occur in s u c h a 
way a s to be interpreted as cause and effect. Note that if 
we are not at the scene to experience the event at first 
hand , then it will be our discovery of the event that 
triggers our emotion. 
a) They were depressed by ( hearing about) the 
situation in Lebanon . 
b) The President said he was absolutely stunned b y 
(the news of) his death. (C.T . 31/5/90:21) 
My emotion will coincide with the moment of hearing the 
news . 
I propose the following explication: 
Xis {past part. emotion term} BY Y 
X thinks: 
Y did something/ Something (Y) happened. 
X feels something because of that. 
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3.3 WITH 
annoyed, cross, furious, unhappy, upset, Angry, 
disappointed, fed up, delighted , satisfied, pl eased , 
disgusted, can all take with . The list includes both 
positive and negative emotions; there are both adjectives 
and past participles. To identify what they have in common, 
it may be more profitable to contrast them with emotion 
terms that cannot be followed by with. 
the 
I t 
It ft surprise group -
e.g. * surprised with 
• astonished with 
• amazed with. 
seems that these emotion terms 
One such group is 
refer only to the 
experience at the moment of discovery of some situation. 
Their caus~ is not a particular situation as such , but the 
shock of discovery of that situation. Their duration is 
brief, and beyond the control of the experiencer . 
prolong the emotion by dwelling on the cause. 
We cannot 
Nor can we 
truly re-experience the emotion by recalling the moment of 
discovery. We can recall that we were amazed/ surprised/ 
astonished by something, but our recollection will lack the 
initial gasp, the widened eyes, the quickened heartbeat, 
that accompanied the original experience. 
The emotion words that can take with need not do so in 
all circumstances. Acceptability depends also on the nature 
of Yin the frame Xis em-ed with Y. 
Consider the following: 
108 
a) He was annoyed with George. 
b) He wa s annoyed with the dogs (? snakes) . 
c) ~ He was annoyed with the barking of the dogs. 
d) ~? He was annoyed with the way I was treated. 
Discussing each of these 1n turn: 
a) He was annoyed with George . A human Y seems always 
acce ptable . It seems that we can continue to be annoyed/ 
fed up/ pleased/ angry with people because their continued 
presen ce or existence continues to feed our emotion . 
Consider I was annoyed with George for forgetting the milk. 
Forgetting the milk, although the initial cause of my 
feeling, 1s now only secondary. My emotion 1s no longer 
simply a response to what George did, but has become a 
s hort -t erm attitude towards George himself. George 1s now 
the object rather than the cause of my emotion . 
b) He was annoyed with the dogs. Animals come into the 
s ame category as people if they are seen as particular 
animals with a continued presence -e.g. his three sheepdogs. 
This situation 1s more 
domestic animals. 
1 ikely with domestic than non-
?He was annoyed with the snakes. 
c) ~ He was annoyed with the barking of the dogs. Their 
barking 1s the actual cause of the emotion, not merely its 
object. If the barking ceases, the emotion ceases. By lS 
required here. 
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d) •? He 1s annoyed with the way he was treated . I suggest 
He 1.s annoyed at the way he was treated is more acceptable 
h e re . The trigger of the emotion is awareness of an event. 
S uch things, 1 ike facts, 
terms of having duration. 
discussion of at. 
are not normally considered in 
This is explored more fully in my 
The following may provide further clues as to the nature of 
Y: 
I 'm delighted with my new dress. It's so easy to wear. 
I am thrilled with the view from the kitchen. 
•I am thrilled with your arrival. 
I am disappointed with the quality of Sydney's a1.r. 
•Tam disappointed with your dismissal. 
The crucial property for Y seems to be that it should be an 
enduring entity, the thought or presence of which can 
continue to feed our emotion for some time after its initial 
impact. The arrival and dismissal mentioned 
unacceptable sentences are important as happenings; 
duration is irrelevant. 
in the 
their 
Note the difference in meaning between the following: 
I was pleased by your response. 
momentary response, now past) 
I was pl eased with your response. 
(i.e your action - a 
(Perhaps something 
that existed on paper, but certainly 1n my memory. 
be something that continued to pleas~ me.) 
It must 
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I was pleased with your results until I heard what the 
rest of the class got. 
for some time). 
( I thought about your results 
I was disappointed by his failure to telephone . (His 
action is the direct cause of my emotion . ) 
I was disappointed with the results of the ele c tion . 
(They have consequences that continue to produce this 
emotion). 
There 1s one property which all emotion terms that can 
be followed by with must contain. They all include an 
evaluative component (This is good/bad). When we say X 1.s 
em-ed with Y, we mean not only that this 1s the emotion X 
experienced over a particular time, but also that X has made 
an evaluation of Y. To say: 
Xis pleased/delighted/thrilled 
unhappy/disappointed with Y 
tells us the extent to which X approves or disapproves of Y. 
I propose the following explication: 
Xis {adj or past part . emotion term} WITHY 
When X thinks of Y 
X thinks: Y is good/bad. 
X thinks about this for some time. 
X can feel something for some time because of 
that. 
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3. 4 AT 
At identifies precise location. No other dimensions , 
of time or space, are involved. In the frame Xis em-ed at 
Y, we find that the words that can accept at can al so, at 
times, accept with or by or about. 
At/by: 
Consider: a) I was infuriated by her behaviour. 
b) ~I was infuriated at her behaviour . 
c) I was furious at her behaviour. 
While by requires the emotion term to be a past participle, 
at can take either past participle or adjective, so, when 
both forms of an emotion term exist (furious/infuriated), at 
will prefer the more basic adjective. 
participial form of an emotion word 
difference between 
I was horrified by George's action. 
I was horrified at George's action. 
When only the past 
exists, then the 
is simply that by signals a cause/effect relationship while 
at . does not. Because by is used for passive constructions, 
there may also be an inference that the experiencer of an 
"em-ed by" emotion is more likely to be passive in a 
physical sense. If we want to convey the idea of action on 
X's part, then we will be more likely to avoid a passive 
construction and use at (or with). Directive force is not 
part of the meaning of at, however, but only an inference. 
It is inferred strongly in angry-type emotions (J was so mad 
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at him.), less so in constructions with less visible 
-
emotions ( I was disappointed at the amount raised .) 
At/with: 
Many emotion words have built into their meaning a time 
component. It is a central part of the meaning of words 
like obsessed and bored that the feeling continues for some 
time. These can be followed by with (and b:v) but not at. 
I was bored with (~at) the new T. V. programmes. 
I was obsessed with (~at) the T. V. ratings . 
Others, like surprised, shocked, stunned, startled, amazed, 
astonished, aghast, flabbergasted, are always momentary. 
These emotions are experienced at the moment of awareness . of 
new information. Their physical manifestations {quickened 
heartbeat etc.) may endure briefly, but the triggering event 
is momentary. Such emotions cannot be prolonged at will or 
be recreated by recalling the moment of impact. The 
"surprise" emotion words can be followed by at (or by, if 
they are past participles) but not with. 
I was astonished at (~with) the new T. V. prog1·ammes. 
I was shocked at (~with) the T.V ratings. 
Many of the surpr1. se words, which can never take with, 
lack a good/bad component. It is not this, however, which 
distinguishes the with from the at constructions. There are 
a number of emotion words with good/bad components which can 
take at but never ( or almost never) with. 
embarrassed, horrified, aghast and appalled. 
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They include 
a) •?He was embarrassed with his son ' s beha v iour . 
b) •She was horrif i ed with the details of the 
accident . 
c ) ~I was aghast with the Council ' s plan . 
d) ~?They were appalled with his suggestions. 
These words refer to emotions which although perhaps not 
quite as momentary as the surprise group, are short-term 1n 
e ffect. They refer to a particular instance 1n time and 
place, either when something happens if the exper1encer 1s 
present, or when he becomes aware of some situation. The 
c ontrast 1s between before this moment and at this moment . 
Many other emotion words do not have a built-in tim e 
c omponent , but can be temporarily endowed with one by a 
following with or at . 
e.g. a) I am delighted with the idea of painting the house 
pink. 
implies that I like this idea (X 1s good) and often 
think about it, 
while b) I am delighted at the idea of painting the house 
pink. 
stresses the emotion felt at the impact of a new idea. 
This association of with with duration explains its 
tendency to occur more often when Y 
more usual when Y 1s a fact/ide~. 
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. 1s a person, while at is 
The anger-type emotions, 
for instance, are commonly used with with when the focus is 
a person. 
I am angry/annoyed/cross/furious with (? at) George. 
Yet when we talk in terms of facts or ideas, with is not 
usually acceptable. 
I am angry/annoyed/cross/furious at (:t with) the 
thought of apologizing to that fool. 
Dealing with these two in turn: 
i) At/with person Y 
It seems that we are usually angry with people because their 
continued presence or existence continues to feed our 
emotion. Yet with some anger-type words, most notably mad, 
it is arguably more acceptable to say 
I am so mad at Tom. 
than I am so mad with Tom. 
Bolinger writes 
With .. is about as projective as at, but its meaning of 
'association' takes the edge off attitudes of disfavor: 
She is annoyed with me (with what I said) is less sharp 
than She is annoyed at me (at what I said); She was 
furious with me is less apt to refer to real fury than 
She was furious at me . Displeased, disappointed, and 
dissatisfied with express milder displeasure than 
disgusted at or out raged at. The more splenetic moods 
do not admit with: *She was mad (sore) with me. 
(1984:58) 
The choice between I was furious with George and I was 
furious at George is, in ef feet, a choice between stressing 
either a) that I continued to think about George and feel 
furious; 
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or b) that I felt furious at the moment of discovering 
that George has done something. The intensity of the moment 
and the associated physical reaction are stressed. 
ii) At/with+ new idea Y: 
a) I am angry at (~with) not being paid. 
b) I am outraged at (~with) the very idea of your 
living together. 
c) I am alarmed at (~with) the thought of having to go 
to court. 
d) I was upset at (~with) the sight of my former 
husband. 
With is unacceptable because the objects of our emotion 
the facts, thoughts, suggestions, ideas, sensations and so 
on - are new information, the emotional force of which comes 
at the moment of impact. When the idea or thought 1s given 
some duration, e.g. by being written down, or discussed at 
length, then we will prefer with. 
I am fascinated with the idea of starting a business. 
I am pleased with the suggestions made by the 
Committee. 
I am obsessed with the idea of marrying her. 
At/about: 
At is precise in its focus: about is approximate. 
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I am ang r .Y at Tom. (Tom did something. Tom 1s to 
blame.) 
I am angry about Tom. (My quarrel 1s not with Tom, 
but with ot hers responsible for his situation.) 
Words that are concerned with the future, like anxious, 
worried, apprehensive, frequently take about , because the 
experiencer cannot identify precisely what will happen . But 
I ca n be worried at the thought of something. A thought is 
a particular kind of thing, so can be used with at. 
[ propose the following definition: 
X was em-ed AT Y 
When X first thought of Y 
X felt something. 
( I have used past tense rather than present because the 
latter can carry a continuous or iterative interpretation . 
At can be used to refer to an emotion only at the moment of 
first impact. It cannot be used if the emotion is prolonged 
or able to be re-experienced by recalling the triggering 
situation. ) 
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3.5 ABOUT 
-
We can be worried , concerned. anxious, apprehensive, 
nervous about Y, when we think about what could happen to 
him. We can al so be embarrassed, sad, unhappy. pl eased 
about Y, when we think about what has happened to him . 
About brings to mind the idea of approximation rather than 
prec1s1on; of a range of things existing round a central 
situation. The target 1s not a single fixed entity. If I 
rim worried about Y, I am not so much following a single line 
of thought as recogn1z1ng that there are a number of 
possibilities. My focus is on a field that surrounds Y. 
About contrasts with at. About marks the approximate: 
at thP- precise. For this reason, the at emotion words like 
surprised, amazed, astonished, flabbergasted, 
which focus (precisely) on the initial moment 
emotion, co mbine rather uneasily with about -
') I was astonished about your dismissal. 
preferring 
I was astonished to hear/read/learn about your 
dismissal . 
startled. 
of the 
because we have provided a point of first mention, which the 
"surprise" words require, to become the new focus. 
Look at the change 1n meaning when about 1s contrasted 
with with -
I am angry/ upset with George. 
did something.) 
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(Presumably because he 
I am angry/ upset about George. (My quarrel is not 
with George himself . 
focus is on a wider 
c entre.) 
Something has happened to him. 
situation of which George lS 
My 
the 
When Y is an entity, the function of about is to 
diffuse the focus to deflect it from Y itself to Y's 
c ir c umstances. 
Are yo u pleased with your job? 
Are yo u pl eased about your Job? (suggests something 
has happened to it. e.g. It's been reclassified . ) 
However, the NP represented by Y need not be an entity. 
It can also be an action or event. When we say, I'm 
unhapp_-r,,- abo ut losing the election, or I'm embarrassed about 
forgetting his name, or [ feel guilty about leaving the kids 
at home on their own . this assumption that something has 
happened or can happen to Y is clearly not adequate. I am 
unhappy about losing the election because I think it will 
mean three years of high interest rates. I am embarrassed 
about forgetting his name because that implies I dismissed 
him quickly from my mind. I feel guilty about leaving my 
kids at home because I am aware that such action often has 
unf o rtunate consequences. It is the wider implications of Y 
that concern us. This can be described as something that 
happened/can happen because of Y. 
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About 1s frequently used with emotion terms which 
relate to the future worried, concerned, anxious, 
apprehensive. We cannot know precisely what will happen 1n 
the future. We cannot be * conce rned/:t anx1. ous at George . 
Our focus JS on a range of things that can happen to Y. 
I propose the following explication: 
X 1s {adj./p.p. emotion word} ABOUT Y 
When X thinks of Y 
X thinks of other things that happened/ can happen 
to Y/ 
or because of Y. 
X feels something because of that. 
There are two points I should stress. 
have made the focus plural ( things) 
The first 1s that I 
This is to show that 
the focus is not seen as a single clearly defined entity, 
but rather an indeterminate number of things. 
The second 1s that about can relate to both the actual 
I am pleased about George/ getting the job. 
and the potential -
I am worried about George/ getting the Job . 
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3.6 OF 
We can be afraid of, frightened of, terrified of , 
scared of, ashamed of , proud of, Jealous of, env1 ous of , 
g·lad of , sick and tired of Y. Again, the list includes both 
positive and negative emotions, adjectives and past 
participles. The past participles enable us to contrast the 
difference in meaning between by/of minimal pairs -
He was terrified by George's dog . 
He was terrified of George's dog. 
The first refers to a specific instance, located in time. 
Here George's dog is the agent. It has done something which 
caused the terror. In the second, there 1s no specific 
instance. The emotion has been generalized. George's dog 
is no longer the agent, because nothing specific has 
happened. Rather, it 1s the object of the emotion, as 
something unchanging and in~apable of action might be. 
He was terrified of death. 
• He was terrified by death . 
If someone declares he 1s terrified of the dark or 
proud of his bushranging grandfather, we do not necessarily 
interpret his words as meaning that he is experiencing the 
emotion at this moment, but simply that this 1s his attitude 
towards something. Such emotions may have been first caused 
by a particular occurrence, but they are no longer dependent 
on it. They presuppose a generalization. 
Because George was cruel to me when I was younger, I 
am terrified of George. ( whenever I meet him). 
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Because my son won a gold medal, I am proud of my 
son. (not merely proud that he won a medal) 
Because I stole $5 I am ashamed of myself. (not merel y 
ashamed of my action.) 
Because Tom got the job I'd been promised, I am jealous 
of Tom. (not just of his advantages.) 
Ho wever, we may not know why we are frightened of 
heights, or terrified of the dark. It may be difficult for 
us to identify just why we are ashamed or proud of our Irish 
blood . When we feel ashamed or proud or frightened, we are 
not primarily concerned with cause. I shall argue that our 
c on c e t' n s 1 i e no t on 1 y w i t h t he pre s en t , bu t a 1 s o w i t h t he 
future . and with what we want or do not want to happen to 
us . 
Bolinger (1977:143-150) and 1984:52) distinguishes 
between what he calls emotions caused and emotions 
projected. Emotions caused are contingent reactions to 
something (I am cross with you for forgetting the milk./ I 
am surprised at the way you behaved last night.) Emotions 
projected express our attitudes towards something (I am 
frightened of heigh ts . ) Use of an emotion term with of 
indicates that the emotional response has distanced itself 
from its cause , and has become independent of a time frame. 
In Bolinger's term, it has become projective. 
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The of emotion terms are unusual in that, apart from 
-
the past participles , scared, terrified and frightened, 
which can take by and at, they rarely accept other 
prepositions. What 1s particularly interesting is that a 
word that accepts of can never accept with. I cannot be 
jealous, ashamed. proud, afraid #with Y. 
In other words, we cannot make any emotion projective 
simply by adding of. I cannot be ~angry of, ~surprised of, 
and so on. There must be something within the meaning of the 
emotion word itself that determines whether or not it takes 
of. 
If an emotion is generalized, it does not exist 1n a 
time frame . Or we might say that it is as applicable to our 
future as our past. If I examine the meaning of each of the 
of emotion terms 1n detail, I find that there is one element 
whi c h they all share. They all involve the future of the 
experiencer. Not the object (Y) but the experiencer (X). 
More specifically, they involve something he wants or wants 
not to happen to him. This property is not always obvious . 
Yet it is an obligatory part of the scenario that each of 
these emotion terms have built into their meaning. I will 
attempt to illustrate the existence of this aspect of 
meaning with each of the of emotion words in turn. 
i) Terrified, frightened, scared, afraid. 
all clearly contain the meaning -
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X thinks: Something bad can happen to me. 
I don't want this. 
c f . worried: a) I am afraid of George. 
b) I am worried about (*of) George. 
Wo rried co ntains the idea that something bad could happen to 
lhe object, as opposed to the experiencer. 
cf. horrified: a) I am terrified of the sight o f blood. 
b) I am horrified at (*of) the sight of 
blood. 
Terrified and horrified are words ~ o similar both 1n form 
and 1n terms of our physical 1·e action that one might expect 
them to behave 1n identi c3l fashion. Yet we can say: 
a) I am t c.1.·1 ·i f'i ed of snakes. 
but not b) * I ~~ horrified of snakes. 
I f I sl :11 terr i f i e d, my mind races to the poss i bi 1 i t y of a 11 
sort s :..; f dreadful but as yet unknown consequences. My 
emotion 1s caused by the potential, by the thought of what 
can happen to me. 
-
If I am horrified, I am focussing on something I 
actually see or hear or otherwise experience at this 
particular moment. I am not concerned with my future. 
ii) Proud 
Being proud of something includes as part of its 
meaning (See p.24) 
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It 
X thinks: 1. People can know something ( Y) about me . 
2. People can think something good about me 
because of this. 
3. I want other people to know about this . 
lS also possible to demonstrate that proud has 
generalized reference, while pleased, for example, must have 
specific reference. 
Consider the following: 
c) I am proud to know you. (general attitude) 
d) * I am proud to meet you. 
e) I am pleased to meet _you. (specific reaction) 
f) * I am pleased to know you. 
I am proud to know you = I am proud that I know ,YOU. My 
e motion applies generally, not to a particular time. In 
c ontrast, I am pl eased to meet you has reference to a 
particular event in time. 
iii) Ashamed: 
Ashamed includes the following as part of its meaning 
(p.19) -
X thinks: 1. People can know something (Y) about 
me. 
2. People can think something bad about 
me because of this. 
3. I don't want other people to know 
about this. 
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Consider: 
a) I was ashamed to know - (* to learn) that I had 
failed. 
b) I was disappointed to learn (~ to know) that I had 
failed. 
The timing of an event 1s not relevant to shame. My shame 
applies not just to myself at the moment of failure, but to 
myse 1 f globally. I t 1 s my know 1 edge o f my f a i 1 u r e t ha t 
makes me ashamed of myself. In contrast, my disappointment 
stems from the moment of finding out that I had failed - the 
moment of contrast between what I expected and what actually 
happened. It 1s the event of failure that causes my 
disappointment. 
iv) Glad: 
My definition of glad · includes: 
1. Something happened/ can happen. 
2. I want this. 
while pleased, in contrast, 1s restricted to 
1. Something good happened. 
When we want to describe our attitude to something that has 
happened, either word can be used. 
I was glad/ pleased when I got my results. 
I argue that these alternatives do not refer to the same 
thing. We are describing our attitude to what appears to be 
the same thing (my results), but the two emotions are in 
fact measuring different things. When we use glad, we are 
referring to our feelings at the existence of something. We 
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are contrasting our feelings with what we would feel at the 
absence of results . I was glad when I got my results 
because I had been waiting anxiously for a month. When we 
use pleased, we·are using an evaluative term. 
ou r results on a good - bad scale. 
Compare 
with 
a) Jam pleased with your advice. 
b) I am glad of your advice . 
We have rated 
The former is evaluative, so can only relate to advice that 
has actually been given. It contains an assessment of its 
quality. Sentence b) indicates my attitude to your advice, 
seen 1n terms of a two way choice, its existence or its 
absence. This advice cannot be specific: it means any 
advice of yours, at any time. Whi 1 e a) 1 s concerned with 
the quality of the advice, b) is concerned only with its 
existence, regardless of time. 
v) Envious, jealous: 
Both words contain as part of their meaning -
X thinks: Y has something. 
I want this. 
Compare: 
a) I am envious/Jealous of George's ability to make 
money. 
b) I am impressed with George's ability to make money. 
In sentence a), I am envious because George has this 
ability, and I lack it. I see our two situations in terms 
of existence or non-existence. In sentence b), my emotion 
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1s an evaluation of s pec i fi c instan ces when Ge o r ge h as 
demonstrated this ab i lity . 
vi ) Tired (as 1n sick and tired): 
I have argued earlier that tired as a ph y si c al term a nd 
tired as an emotion term behave differentl y. Altho ugh t he 
f o rmer looks like the past participle of the transitive ve rb 
ti r e -
Working 1n the sun all day tires him . 
it i s difficult to find an aceptable passive sentence -
~ He 1s tired by working 1n the sun all day . 
We prefer to rephrase it using after or from or a because 
c lause . 
He 1s tired after working 1n the sun all day. 
I s ugge s t th.at this 1s because tired has l ost its status a s 
a past participle and become fully adjectival 1n function . 
When we are tired, or ill, or cold, or hungry , we do not 
nece ss arily look for an external cause . We want simply to 
describe an internal state . This 1s one way 1n whi c h 
sensations differ from emotions, which typically have an 
external object - angry with someone , proud of someone, and 
so on. 
Tired 1n its emotional sense must be followed by of+ 
noun phrase. Consider the difference: 
a) I am tired after working all night . 
b) I am tired of working all night . 
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In sentence a), the physical tired, like all physical terms , 
is reactive. This can be demcinstrated by changing all night 
to all last night -
a) I am tired after working all last night. 
b) , the emotional tired, shows my general attitude. It 
cannot have specific reference: 
b) •I am tired of working all last night. 
I am tired of working all night implies that, given the 
choice, I would choose not to work all night. I see the 
object, working all night, in terms of existence/ non-
existence. 
The crucial point is that of emotion words always 
project something on to the experiencer that he wants or 
does not want. We are not concerned with evaluating the 
object, but with its existence or non-existence. Words like 
scared o r terr .i f i e d or fr i gh ten e d can t a k e b o t h by and of 
because the prepositions cover separate territory by 
identifies the cause, of the object. With and of are 
fighting over the same territory - object, not cause but 
measuring it from different perspectives. With indicates an 
assessment on a good bad scale of something whose 
existence is taken for granted: of indicates a reaction to 
the existence or non-existence of something, regardless of 
time. Emotion terms must belong to one group or the other. 
They cannot move between the two. 
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I propose the following explication: 
3.7 TO 
Xis {adj./past parf. emotion word} OF Y 
When X thinks of Y 
X thinks: Something can happen to me. 
I want/don't want this. 
X feels something because of that. 
To implies "goal" - by which I mean direction of action 
towards something either 1n a place sense (towards location 
X) or 1n a time sense (i.e. the future). Following emotion 
terms, to can occur 1n the following frames 
(1) Xis {adj./p.p. emotion word} TO NP 
e.g. I am grateful to George for his help. 
I am sympathetic to your needs. 
(2) Xis {adj./p.p. emotion word} TO VP 
e.g. I am eager to visit Nepal. (unrealized event) 
I am pleased to see you. (realized event) 
(To in this frame introduces a complement clause: it 1s not 
a preposition. I discuss it here because its role following 
emotion words seems to be comparable with that of the 
prepositions, except that it marks a relationship with a 
verb rather than a noun.) 
Dealing with each 1n turn -
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3.7.1 Xis {adj./p.p. emotion word} TO NP 
Directing our emotion towards someone would seem to be quite 
commonplace. When we are angry or upset or surprised or 
d e lighted, our emotion is frequently directed at something 
or somebody . Yet there are very few emotion terms that c an 
be followed by to. 
*I am angry to John. 
*I am delighted to you. 
The only words I have identified as fitting this frame are 
grateful 
obliged 
sympathetic 
devoted. 
To isolate what it is that they all share, I shall try to 
define each word 1n turn. 
Grateful: It is significant that one can only be grateful 
to a person or to an organization made up of a body of 
people ( the University, the Government etc) . We cannot be 
grateful to a tree for shading us, although we can be 
grateful for the tree's shade. (I am excluding metaphoric 
usage, · when inanimate objects are credited with thought and 
emotion.) 
Compare a) 
b) 
I am grateful to him. 
I am grateful for him. 
If the object of our gratitude 1s someone who has done 
something, we will be grateful to him. If the object of our 
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gratitude is incapable of action. (e.g. the tree that shades 
us), we will be grateful for it. If it is human but not 
represented as capable of intent, (e.g. my newborn son), we 
will be grateful for him or for his company. It 1s arguable 
whether we can be grateful to animals. Can I be grateful to 
my dog for staying with me when I broke my leg? I think I 
am more likely to be grateful for my dog's company. I 
interpret this requirement for a human Y as meaning that Y 
must be ca pable of understanding the wants of others. 
I propose the following explication: 
Grateful: 
X thinks this: 
1. Y did something because Y thought: 
X would want this. 
2. Because of this, I want to do something good 
for Y. 
X feels something because of that. 
Obliged: I feel obliged to someone who has done something 
for me. Grateful and obliged behave 1n the same way 
syn tact i ca 11 y except that for the lat t e r , men t i on of the 
human object is usually obligatory: 
a) He was obliged to them for their help. 
b) ~He was obliged for their help. 
The only exception to this is the colloquial "Much obliged" , 
when it is spoken directly to the person who has helped, 
with the pragmatic function of thanking them. The 
requirement that the object should be capable of action and 
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intent is the same as for grateful. 
following expli cation : 
Obliged: 
X thinks this: 
1. Y did something good for me. 
I propose the 
2. Because of that, I should do something good 
for Y. 
3. I want to do something good for Y. 
X feels something because of that. 
Sympathetic: 
others. 
One i s sympathetic to the needs and desires of 
a) The Administration was sympathetic to the 
Club 's plans . 
b) The Council was sympathetic to the plight of the 
homeless. 
c) *He was sympathetic to the needs of the cattle. 
It is not sufficient that the object be seen to lack 
something. 
something, 
The object 
and have some 
must be aware that he lacks 
viewpoint in considering the 
future. 
be human. 
There is the same requirement for the possessor to 
I propose the following explication: 
Sympathetic: 
X thinks this: 
1. Y wants something. 
2. I would want Y to have this. 
X feels something because of that . 
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Devoted: One 1s normally devoted to people such as one ' s 
parents, or one's old teacher . A dog is described as being 
devoted to its master. What we feel lS long-term , 
unque s tioning , undivided loyalty in return for something of 
great value. We feel something good for them because we 
think they feel the same for us . In a religious sense , 
devotions are what we offer for a higher being who , we are 
taught, loves and cares for us. One can also be devoted to 
one's career or to one's research. Here the term is used 
metaphorically, implying that one cares for something 
inanimate as if it is the source of what is essential to 
one's life. I propose the following explication: 
Devoted: 
X thinks this: 
1. Y does/did many good things for me. 
2. I want to do many good things for Y. 
X feels something good because of that. 
All four words share the requirement for the following 
NP to be not only animate but also human (or divine). So 
what we are considering is the meaning of to in the frame X 
is {adj./p.p. emotion word} TO person Y. 
My definition is: 
Xis {adj./p.p. emotion word} TO person Y: 
When X thinks of Y, X thinks: 
1. Y did something. 
2. Because of that, I want to do something 
good for Y. 
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So not only mu st one have intentions towards someone, 
but they must be positive intentions. This explains why 
one cannot be delighted or angry or surprised to George. 
Delighted is a reaction to George or something he has done. 
It car ries a message of positive evaluation but not positive 
intentions. Angry cannot be fol lowed by to because one's 
intentions towards the object of one's anger are bad. 
Surprise d is a reaction without any intent. 
3.7.2 1~ followed by a complement clause: 
Xis {adj./p.p. emotion word} TO VERB: 
Sentences with this structure may be seen as of twc) 
different kinds, unrealized and realized . 
i ) 
by 
Unrealized: These involve emotions that are triggered 
thinking about some potential 
exemplified by sentences such as: 
I am eager to learn. 
I am anxious to meet him. 
I am afraid to go inside. 
action. They are 
An emotion expressed in this way requires the experiencer to 
have a predetermined attitude towards doing something. 
Bolinger writes (1984:53), "With emotions that accompany 
unfulfilled actions, we find pure ·goal' these may be both 
drives and fears." I can list eager, anxious, keen and 
impatient 
reluctant 
as emotions 
indicating 
indicating 
fears. 
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drives; afraid and 
Wierzbicka (1988:98} 
distinguishes a similar group, which she refers to as 
emotions based on "wanting" (used broadly, to include "want 
not". M.O.) The construction consists of two sequential 
actions, one expressing the emotion, the other expressing 
the anticipated action. I am anxious/ to meet him. Whether 
or not the action takes place is irrelevant. Compare 
a) [ am afraid to go inside. 
here. 
I'm going to stay right 
b) J am afraid to go inside, but I have no choice. 
The subjects of the two verbs are co-referential. The 
person experiencing the emotion is the person involved in 
the action, even if 1n a passive sense ( I am afraid to be 
seen here.) 
I propose the following definition: 
Xis {adj./p.p.emotion term} TO VERB (unrealized): 
ii) 
When X thinks "I will do something (Z)" 
X feels something 
because X wants to do/ 
not do Z. 
Realized: This group (containing what Wierzbicka 
(p.98) calls emotions based on awareness) are exemplified by 
sentences such as 
I am delighted to see so many people here. 
I am disappointed to hear you can't come. 
I am glad to be home. 
I was appalled to learn how many were killed. 
136 
I was annoyed to find him still there. 
I am sorry to hear that. 
I am so relieved to get my licence. 
Here the emotion is experienced by X at the time he becomes 
aware of an event (which is usually, but not always at the 
time of its happening.) I call these realized, as opposed 
t o u n r· ea l i zed c on s t r u c t i on s . There are three co~ponents to 
this construction the experiencing of the emotion, the 
awareness of an event, and the event itself . I was 
appalled/ to learn/ how many were killed. 
But what has actually caused X's emotion - the event or 
the discovery of the event? Both parts are necessary. i.e. 
i) The exper1encer must hold some prior expectation about 
whatever happens, and it 1s this which determines the nature 
of the emotion. His emotion 1s caused, 1n part, by the 
c omparison between his expectations and what actually 
happened. If I am disappointed, what happened was worse 
than I expected. 
than I expected. 
If I am relieved, what happened was better 
If I am glad to be home, I have been 
looking forward to it 1n a positive sense and it 1s just as 
good as I expected. Wierzbicka extends the requirement that 
the exper1.encer hold a prior expectation to include 
occasions which the experiencer has not actually considered , 
but to which he could have predicted his emotional reaction. 
This qualification covers sentences like I was delighted/ 
surprised to hear that Jim and Betty got married. 
(1988:104) 
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ii) The emotion is triggered by awareness of a particular 
event. This is often expressed as a verb of perception or 
o f c o ming to know ( to see, to hear , to learn, to find out, 
to discover etc.) This word will at times be omitted, (I am 
so relieved to get my licence = It is the knowledge that I 
have got my licence that causes my relief) but it will 
always be retrievable from the context. Bolinger has 
discussed this point at length in his writing on surpr1.se 
(1884:45-58), contrasting the acceptability of 
* I was surprised to fall. 
with I was surprised to have fal 1 en. equating the latter 
with I was surprised to know I had fallen. 
in brief, the second group require 
a prior expectation about or attitude to some event; 
awareness of that event's happening. 
Whereas the unrealized construction consists of two 
verbs with co-referential subjects, (X thinks: I will do 
something.) the realized construction, with three separate 
actions (I am disappointed/ to hear/ that you can't come.) 
requires only the first two to have co-referential subjects: 
the third action need not directly involve the exper1encer. 
I express this as 
happening/happened). 
X thinks : I know 
I suggest the following definition: 
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Something ( Z) 1S 
• 
Xis {adj./emotion word} TO VERB (realized): 
When X thinks: I know something (Z) is happen i ng/ 
happened 
X feels something 
because X wanted/would have wanted Z 
did not want/would not have wanted Z . 
(The conditional is included to cover those examples where 
the experiencer has not previously considered an event , but 
yco uld ha v e predicted his reaction to it in advance.) 
For convenience, I repeat my definition for "unrealized" 
verbs -
to 
Xis {adj./p.p. emotion term} TO VERB (unrealized) 
When X thinks: I will do something (Z) 
X feels something 
because X wants to do/ 
not do Z . 
What the two frames share is the implication that prior 
an event, the experiencer already holds a mental 
construct towards such an event . 
Du f f 1 e y , i n a de ta i 1 e d e· x am in a t i on o f the i n f i n i t i v e 
verb, explains how its meaning can apply to both realized 
and unrealized events. He writes: 
The meaning of the to infinitive is a combination 
of two potentials: the potential meaning of the 
infinitive {i . e. the bare verb - M.O.} , which gi v es the 
speaker the possibility of representing the realization 
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of any event as unfolding from its beginning to its 
end; and the potential sigificate of to , which affords 
the speaker the possibility of representing any 
movement in time from a before-position to an after-
position (corresponding here to the beginning of the 
infinitive event . ) (In Press:Ms.pp 8 , 9) 
This representation, he submits, fits both types of the 
to infinitive the realized and the non-realized as 
follow s: 
i ) The realized: The movement 1n time represented by to 
may continue up to the moment at which the infinitive event 
begins. 
and my 
This corresponds with Duffley's example 
He managed to get f1·ee. 
I am delighted to hear it. 
Duffl e y represents this diagrammatically (p.10) as 
to 
- - - ---- - ----------------------->: 
REFORE AFTER 
(managed) (get free) 
i i ) The unrealized: Alternatively, the movement 1n time 
can be intercepted by the speaker before it reaches the 
moment at which the infinitive 
corresponds with Duffley's 
He tried to get free. 
and my I am anxious to meet him. 
Duffley represents this as: 
--------> 
BEFORE 
(tried) 
to 
I 
- - - - - -, 
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event begins. This 
AFTER 
(get free) 
I 
3.8 FOR 
-
In the frame X 1s em-ed FOR Person Y -
as in She felt sorry for them 
I'm pleased for you 
I was embarrassed for them 
or the non-specific -
1 feel for her. 
X feels an emotion on behalf of others. I express this as -
For 
Xis {adj./p.p. emotion word} FOR person Y 
When X thinks of Y 
X thinks: Something happened to someone (Y) 
This is good/bad. 
X feels something because of that. 
indicates that the emotion lS experienced by 
someone other than the person directly involved in the 
action. The emotion is other-oriented. This 1 s why, as 
Wierzbicka has pointed out (1988:114), one cannot say 
*I was pleased/ embarrassed/ sorry for me. 
However, I was sorry for m_vself is acceptable, while I was 
embarrassed for myself and I was pl eased for myself are 
acceptable in certain contexts. For instance, suppose 
someone asks me if I am embarrassed/ pleased for my husband. 
I reply, No only for myself. This 1s what Wierzbicka 
calls contrastive use of for. Thought of 1n this way, the 
sentence 1.s equivalent to I was sorry "not for someone 
else" . There lS still the sense of II someone else" of 
agent and benefactor as distinct entities. (Wierzbicka:115) 
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We accept sorr,Y for myself more readily than pleased 
for myself because sorry has fewer options other than the 
contrastive one. Co ntrast this with pleased we can be 
pleased with or at or about or by: and with embarrassed we 
ca n be embarrassed at or about or by. 
o nl y be sorry about or sorry for. 
With sorry, we can 
as in 
For may also occur in the frame 
Xis em-ed FOR situation Z 
a) He was sorry for misleading them. 
b) He was sorry for the mess. 
c) I was grateful for his help. 
d) I was grateful for the shade . 
Sentences b) and d) have objects where no person is 
mentioned. Sentences a) and c) have indirect mention of a 
person - them and his. These two sentences may be read as : 
a) X was sorry for doing Z (to Y). 
c) X was grateful (to Y) for doing Z. 
Many emotion words can have a double object, one human, 
the other spelling out the human's action. 
e.g. I am angry with George for forgetting the milk. 
I am disgusted with you for wearing your slippers. 
I am surprised at you for quitting. 
but in such examples the for object can only be included in 
second position, and then only if the first object is a 
person. 
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•I am angry for forgetting the milk. 
•I am disgusted with what you did, for wearing your 
slippers . 
With sorry and grateful, however, the for object can stand 
alone: 
a) X was sorry for the mess . 
b) _'( was grateful for the shade. 
I suggest that sorry and grateful both include as part 
of their meaning the sense that there is someone we owe 
these feelings to. Sorry always implies that someone has 
been affected by our action. Grateful always implies that 
so meone has done something for us. This 1. s usually 
interpreted as someone other than self. If I say I am 
grat e ful for the shade, I am, 1.n effect, personifying the 
tree, implying that the tre~ has acted to bestow this on me . 
The fa c t that the to object need not be mentioned following 
s orry and grateful indicates that the person - the other 
L S already assumed to exist. 
I propose the following definition: 
Xis em-ed FOR Z (something that involves person Y) 
When X thinks of Z 
X thinks: Z happened to Y/ 
because Y did something. 
This is good/ bad 
X feels something because of that. 
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and to facilitate comparison, I repeat my earlier 
definition: 
Xis {adj./p.p. emotion word} FOR person Y 
When X thinks of Y 
X thinks: Something happened to Y. 
This is good/bad. 
X feels something because of that. 
Regardless of whether the focus lS on person y 
directly , or on something (Z) that involves person Y, for 
has the effect of attributing the emotion to other than Y. 
3.9 OVER 
Over is used relatively infrequently 1n the frame X 1.s 
adj./ P. P. Y. I am aware of no emotion term that prefers 
(is most usually followed by) over in the above frame . Over 
seems to be · used to achieve a particular, marked meaning , 
following emotion terms that more frequently take at or 
about. It occurs in sentences like: 
a) I am upset over (about) the closure of Higgins 
Primary School. 
b) I am disappointed over (at) our failure to secure 
the lease. 
c) I am annoyed over (at) the Government's whole 
approach to tourism. 
Consider first the at/over contrast. At 1s used when the 
following NP, the object of our emotion, 1s conceptualized 
as existing without other dimensions, e.g . of ti me or 
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structure. Over gi ves the impression of a more co mpl ex 
object. Look at the following: 
a) Bhutto was outraged over Sind bombings . 
(C.T. 17/7/90:5) 
b) We were upset over his death . 
The death and the bombings may have been instantaneou s 
events, but to the experiencer they are much more than this: 
they are complex, multi-faceted situations. There se ,-'ms to 
be a preference for using over when the following NP 
c o n t a i n s t he i de a o f some t h i ng s e en i n i t s en t it .. ~. t y , as 
illustrated by: 
a) I'm pretty pissed off ove r the whole deal. 
b ) I · m worked up o v c ::· the Govern men t · s who 1 e a ppr o a ch 
to education . 
Sentences like 
~I· m amazed ,.:i ver your divorce 
are pre:::umably impossible because the " " surprise words 
always focus on the moment of hearing new information , while 
over emphasizes the complete event. 
In contrast, we find utterances like: 
It was such a small thing to get cross over. 
Perhaps the significance of using over is that it ironically 
underlines the lack of complexity of the "small thing," thus 
providing grounds for the speaker's surprise . 
Consider now the about/over contrast. 
The Leader of the Residents' Rally .. said .. that , 
lawyer he was more embarrassed than anyone over 
fluoride controversy. (C.T. 4/10/89:1) 
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The Leader could also be embarrassed about the fluoride 
controversy. About is used when we wish to focus attention 
on the wider implications of an event rather than the event 
itself. What 1s embarrassing the speaker is not just the 
jmplications, although they may well be a part of it, so much 
a s t h e who 1 e s o r t' y s t o I' y , the whole sequence of events . 
However, not all emotion words that accept about will accept 
over: 
I am anxious about your health. 
but ~I am anxious over your health. 
and again: 
I am worried about George . 
but *I am worried over George. 
What do wo rried and anxious share that embarrassed and ups et 
do not? The answer is the involvement of the future . I can 
o nly be e motional over something that is 1n the past , that 
is complete or whole, that 1s "over". 
One might argue that it is stretching things a bit far 
to claim that these two senses of over are related. George 
Lakoff, basing his work on studies by Brugman ( 1981) and 
Lindner 
s patial 
(1981) 
senses 
shows 
of the 
the relations 
word over 
among the various 
and describes the 
metaphorical extensions of the spatial senses. (1987:416-
461)). For instance, there are spatial senses of over as in 
He walked over the hill (where a path is traced) 
or He lives over the hill (where the end-point of the path 
1s envisaged), 
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where the image might be extended to an emotional Journey 
(He puzzled over the problem) or an emotional endpoint to a 
Journey ( He was embarrassed over the whole fiasco). 
At the beginning of this discussion I commented that 
over does not often occur in the X 1.s em-ed Y frame. 
There 1s another construction used 1n the expression of 
emotions which does rely much more on over. It involve s 
those emotion terms which have the form of intransitive 
verbs. I list: 
[ grieved over my loss. 
I wept over his death. 
I anguished over my decision . 
I laughed and cried over the news. 
[ fretted over the situation. 
[ smarted over his insult. 
[ see the d over hi s 1· e pl y . 
I fumed over his carelessness. 
I sweated over my answer . 
In each case it 1.s possible to see the action either as a 
Journey or the emotional endpoint to a Journey. 
I suggest the following explication for Xis em-ed OVERY: 
When X thinks of Y 
X thinks: Some time before now, Y happened. 
X thinks about it for some time . 
X feels something because of that. 
147 
3.10 Conclusion: In this chapter I have tried to isolate 
the meanings of each of the eight prepositional 
constructions as they oc c ur in the frame X 1s em-ed --- Y . 
Not only has this exercise been useful to me in the 
unravelling of the meaning of emotion terms. but I believe 
it may be useful 1n a wider survey of the meaning of 
prepositions right across the language. Wierzbicka , in a 
detailed examination of the meaning of over two hundred 
speech act verbs has observed similar semantic/syntactic 
patterns 1n the prepositions that follow such verbs: e.g. 
X complains of a headache. 
?X complains about a headache. 
•X complains of the weather. 
X complains about the weather. 
She writes: 
With this experience [bf writing a Dictionary of Speech 
Act Verbs] behind me, I feel confident to assert that 
particularly strong evidence for semantic formulae 
comes from syntax, and that syntactic properties of 
speech act verbs provide astonishingly reliable clues 
to their semantic structure. I have tried to explore 
a claim that shared syntactic patterns are likely to 
reflect shared semantic components. 
(Wierzbicka 1987:24) 
I venture to claim that, in the same way, the syntactic 
properties of emotion words provide reliable clues to their 
semantic structure. 
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4. CONCWSION 
This thesis began as an exploration of the syntactic 
behaviour of emotion terms. Working on the principle that 
syntac ti c behaviour is related to meaning, I have 
endeavoured to discover what semantic facts we can learn 
from syntax . What I found can be described under three 
headings: 
a) the role of the sentence construction; 
b) the role of the preposition; 
c) the role of other syntactic properties. 
a) Sentence Construction: Whether we choose to say I am 
proud of my garden or I take pride in my garden or I pride 
m.rself on my garden tells us something about how 
conceptualize the emotion. 
I have identified four main sentence constructions: 
i) Xis adj./past participle(+ prep.phrase) 
(Mary 1.s furious (with George)) 
ii) X TAKES noun+ prep.phrase 
(Mary takes pride in her garden) 
iii) X verbs Y 
( Mary 1 aves George) 
iv) X verbs (prep.phrase) 
(Mary worries (about George). 
we 
For each emotion word the choice of construction varies. The 
construction we use can tell us, for instance, whether the 
experiencer is doing something or simply being acted upon ; 
whether the experiencer's volition 1s involved; whether the 
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experiencer is fo c us sing o n the appraised object directly or 
indirectly; and so on. 
b) Role of prepositions: When one work s with emotion terms 
1n co nt ext, it is difficult not to be struck by the rang·e 
and selective behaviour of the prepositions that follow the 
emotio n words. I believe these also are important in 
helping u s understand how we conceptualize emotions. They 
throw light on the nature of the perspectives available. 
For instance, the prepositions in the frame Xis em-ed -- Y 
tell us that emotions are typically related to some external 
o bj ect or situation, and that there are a limited number of 
wa ys in which this object or situation can be appraised 
namely: 
a) 1n terms of cause ( by) 
b) 1n terms of value/duration (with) 
c ) as appraised at moment of impact (at) 
d) in terms of wider implications (about) 
e) as appraised from end-point of action ( over) 
f) in terms of future potential to experiencer (of) 
g) as beneficiary ( for) 
h) as recipient (to). 
As we have seen, not a 11 emotion terms admit all 
perspectives. A causal perspective can only be applied to 
something seen as an action or event. Surprised cannot be 
followed by obsessed by at . The pattern of 
acceptability 
with; 
of following prepositions will sometime s 
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highlight a particular aspect of meaning. However, 
properties such as being perceivable at the moment of impact 
or able to be evaluated 1.n the longer view are often too 
broad to be helpful 1.n formulating definitions. The fact 
that an emotion term can take both at and with simply 
demonstrates that there are no time constraints included 1.n 
its meaning . The preposition that I have found most valuable 
1.n formulating definitions is of. The of emotions must show 
1.n their components that the situation affects the future of 
the exper1.encer. They are no · longer necessarily associated 
with a cause. They are not reactions but projections . 
c ) Other: There are other aspects of syntactic behaviour 
that can inform us about meaning . These include such 
apparent quirks of behaviour as the inability of a certain 
adjective to precede its noun (*an afraid child) 
attempted to treat these in any systematic way 
I have not 
the range 
of possible behaviours 1.s enormous but have dealt with 
them as they arise. 
This thesis does not claim to be a comprehensive survey 
of the syntactic behaviour of emotion terms. I have 
examined 1.n detail only one of the possible syntactic 
constructions, and only the prepositions that occur 1.n this 
one construction. For this reason I think its value is not 
so much in its definitions . as 1.n the process of arriving at 
them. There are substantial areas of syntactic behaviour 
still to be explored. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE METALEXICON 
about 
after 
any 
anyone 
anything 
as 
bad 
be 
because 
before 
believe 
can 
c ause 
could 
do 
else 
feel 
first 
for 
good 
happen 
have 
have to 
he, him , himself 
here 
I, me, myself, my 
if 
it 
know 
less 
long 
many 
may 
more 
no one 
not 
now 
of 
onll(~ 
or 
other 
people 
same 
short 
should 
some 
someone 
something 
that , those 
the 
then 
thing 
think 
this , these 
time 
to 
very 
want 
what 
when 
will 
with 
would 
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APPENDIX B 
SUMMARY OF DEFINITIONS OF PREPOSITIONAL PHRASES 
l . Xis {pBst pBrt. emotion word} BY Y 
2 . 
X thinks: Y did something/ Something (Y) happened. 
X feels something because of that. 
Xis {Bdj./pBst pBrt. em.word} WITHY 
When X thinks of Y 
X thinks: Y is good/bad. 
X thinks about this for some time. 
X ca n feel something for some time because of that. 
3. X WBS {adj./past pBrt. em. word} AT Y 
When X first thought of Y 
X felt something . 
4. Xis {adj./pBst pBrt. em. word} ABOUT Y 
When X thinks of Y 
X thinks of other things that happened/can happen 
to Y 
or because of Y. 
X feels something because of that. 
5. Xis {adj./pBst pBrt. em.word} OF Y 
When X thinks of Y 
X thinks: Something can happen to me. 
I want/don't want this. 
X feels something because of that. 
6a. Xis {Bdj./pBst pBrt. em.word} TO person Y 
When X thinks of Y, X thinks: 
Y did something. 
Because of that I want to do something good for Y. 
X feels something because of that . 
6b. Xis {adj./pBst pBrt. em.word} TO verb (unreBlized): 
When X thinks: I will do something (Z) 
X feels something 
because X wants to do/ 
not do Z. 
6c. Xis {adj.past part. em.word} TO verb (realized) 
When X thinks: I know something (Z) is happening/ 
happened 
X feels something 
because X wanted/would have wanted Z 
did not want/would not have wanted Z . 
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7a. Xis {adj./past part. em.~ord} FOR person Y: 
7b. 
8. 
When X thinks of Y 
X thinks: Something happened to someone (Y). 
This is good/bad. 
X feels something because of that. 
Xis {adj./past part. em word} FOR situation Z 
(involving person Y) 
When X thinks of Z 
X thinks: Z happened to Y/ 
because Y did something. 
This is good/bad. 
X feels something because of that. 
X 1. s {adj. /past part. em.word} OVER Y: 
When X thinks of y 
X thinks: Some time before now, y happened. 
X thinks about it for some time. 
X feels something because of that. 
158 
